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UNITED STATES V. KIRBY: THE CASE FOR ApPELLATE REVIEW OF

GRANTS OF BAIL BY DISTRIcr COURT JUDGES IN INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION CASES

INTRODUcrION

Currently, appellate review is not available when bail is
granted by district court judges in international extradition cases. 1
Review is not available because before a court can hear and decide
any case, it must have jurisdiction? and there is no explicit grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts of appeals to provide review of
grants of bail by district court judges in international extradition
cases.
Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit undertook review of a grant of bail in an international
extradition case, setting forth a theory of jurisdiction that confers
on the federal courts of appeals the power. to undertake this re
view. 3 In United States v. Kirby,4 Terence Damien Kirby, Pol Bren
nan, and Kevin Artt were potential extraditees5 who came to the
United States after escaping from the Maze Prison in Belfast,
Northern Ireland. 6 While awaiting extradition hearings,7 the
1. See infra note 192 for citations to cases where courts undertook review of
grants of bail in international extradition cases without justifying their jurisdictional
basis.
2. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 538 (1974) (stating that jurisdiction is the
authority conferred by Congress to decide a case); see also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases
to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.").
3. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1996). The Kirby court was
the first to explain the jurisdictional basis for its review. See infra Part II.B.2 for a
discussion of the majority's theory of jurisdiction.
4. 106 F.3d 855 (9th CiT. 1996).
5. The United Kingdom had requested extradition of all three from the United
States. See id. at 857.
6. See id.; see also Sandra L.M. Gosser, In re Requested Extradition ofArtt, Bren
nan, and Kirby: Counterterrorism and the Court, 6 TuL. J. INT'L & COMPo LAW 633, 633
34 (1998) (providing additional background material regarding the massive prison
break at the Maze Prison in 1983 during which Kevin Artt, Pol Brennan, and Terence
Kirby escaped).
7. It is important to note that a bail decision made in an international extradition
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United States District Court for the Northern District of California
granted bail to all three. 8 The United States sought appellate re
view of these bail decisions on behalf of the United Kingdom.9
However, the extradition treaties between the United States and
the United Kingdom did not explicitly provide appellate jurisdic
tion to the federal courts of appeals to review these bail decisions.lO
The Ninth Circuit, in Kirby, was the first to explain the juris
dictional basis of the federal courts of appeals to review grants of
bail by district court judges in international extradition cases. l l The
majority concluded that jurisdiction existed to hear the appeal be
cause 28 U.S.c. § 129112 grants appellate jurisdiction to the courts
of appeals to review all final decisions of the district courtS.13 The
dissent, however, concluded that jurisdiction did not exist to hear
the appeal because the bail decision was neither final, nor a deci
sion of the "court. "14
This Note explores the issue of whether appellate jurisdiction
exists for the federal courts of appeals to review grants of bail by
federal district court judges in international extradition cases. Part
I provides a summary of the extradition process and the granting of
bail within that process. This section also contrasts the lack of re
view of grants of bail made in international extradition cases with
the statutory right of the government to appeal grants of bail in
domestic criminal cases. Part I also discusses the history of the final
judgment rule, now embodied in 28 U.S.c. § 1291, which defines
the appellate jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals.
Finally, Part I explains several avenues of review that circumvent
the finality requirement of § 1291. Part II reviews the Ninth Cir
cuit's decision in Kirby, including a discussion of both the majority
and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the arguments made in
Kirby in regard to whether jurisdiction exists in the courts of ap
peals to review bail decisions in extradition cases. Part III then ar
case is but one decision to be made in the extradition process. See infra Part I.A for a
discussion of the extradition process.
8. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858.
9. See id.
10. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., 28 U.S.T. 227, as modified by the
Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K.,
T.I.A.S. No. 12050.
11. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858.
12. Section 1291 states that "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
13. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859-61.
14. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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gues that the Ninth Circuit could have relied on the collateral order
doctrine 15 to establish a jurisdictional basis for appellate review of
grants of bail made by district court judges. Part III further argues
that the Supreme Court should use its rule-making power, found in
28 U.S.c. §§ 2072(c)16 and 1292(e),17 to define finality and thereby
eliminate the confusion surrounding whether a decision is
appealable.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

International Extradition

Before deciding whether a grant of bail given by a federal dis
trict court judge during the international extradition process is ap
pealable to the United States Courts of Appeals, it is necessary to
understand the international extradition process. 1S By doing so, an
informed decision can be made as to what role the bail decision
plays in the extradition process and whether the bail decision is
reviewable.
1.

The Process of International Extradition

Extradition is "the surrender by one nation to another of an
individual accused or convicted of an offence [sic] outside of its own
territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which,
being competent to try and punish him, demands the surrender. "19
The international extradition process begins with a treaty between
two sovereign nations 20 and is further controlled by federal stat
15. The collateral order doctrine provides for appellate review of non-final orders
that conclusively determine a disputed question, resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judg
ment. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See infra Part
I.C.4.c for a thorough discussion of the collateral order doctrine.
16. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.c. § 2072(c) (1994).
17. Federal Courts Study Implementation Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1292(e) (1994).
18. See generally Lis WiehJ, Article, Extradition Law at the Crossroads: The Trend
Toward Extending Greater Constitutional Procedural Protections to Fugitives Fighting
Extradition from the United States, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 729 (1998) (describing the his
torical evolution of United States extradition law, discussing recent court holdings that
the federal extradition scheme violates the Fourth Amendment, and arguing that the
international extradition process may be undermined if further procedural protections
continue to be added to the process).
19. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902).
20. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933) (stating that under
United States law the legal right to demand extradition is only created by treaty, other
wise it rests on comity); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886) (stating
that delivering fugitives apart from any treaty obligation has never been recognized).
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utes. 21 Generally, the iriternational extradition process begins when
a requesting nation files a verified complaint22 with the United
States government charging that the person sought committed one
or more of the crimes listed in the extradition treaty.23
An extradition request must satisfy the terms of the applicable
treaty. For example, a treaty may require that certain documents
supporting the extradition request be provided, including: copies of
the formal charge against the accused, the order for the accused's
arrest, the relevant criminal statutes, and other evidence from
which the accused may be identified, such as fingerprint cards or
photographs. 24 To be successful, the request for extradition must
contain sufficient evidence showing probable cause to believe that
an extraditable offense was committed by the person sought. 25 As
suming that the terms of the treaty have been met, the judicial
body26 will issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. 27 Once the
accused is brought into custody pursuant to the arrest warrant, an
The typical extradition treaty provides a list of offenses which warrant extradition,
a list of conditions which will prevent extradition, general procedural guidelines gov
erning how requests are to be made and what documentation must support requests,
and a provision governing "provisional arrest," which allows for the immediate arrest of
the accused in cases where there is a high likelihood that the accused will flee the re
quested nation before the requested nation receives the necessary supporting documen
tation. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, supra note 10.
21. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 3181-3196 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
22. See id. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The complaint must be made under
oath. See id.
23. See id. For further discussion of the extradition process, see M. CtrnRIF BAS
SIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed.
1996); see also M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 727-1122 (1968)
(describing the extradition process); Jefferey A. Hall, Note, A Recommended Approach
to Bail in International Extradition Cases, 86 MICH. L. REv. 599, 601-03 (1987) (describ
ing the extradition process).
24. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating
to International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 154,157 (1982). Most treaties entered into by
the United States require evidence that would either justify committing the accused for
trial had he committed the crime in the United States or would show that the accused
has already been convicted of the crime in the requesting country. See id. at 158.
25. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Pettit v. Walshe, 194
U.S. 205, 217 (1904) (stating that the evidence must be sufficient to authorize arrest and
commitment for trial according to the law of the place where the arrestee was found);
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that probable cause is
required for a provisional arrest and that the mere existence of Italian arrest warrants is
not enough to establish probable cause).
26. The judicial body in an extradition proceeding may be "any justice or judge of
the United States, or any magistrate ... authorized to do so by a court of the United
States, or any judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State ...." 18
U.S.C. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
27. See id.
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extradition hearing will be held to determine if he will be
extradited. 28
An extradition hearing is not a full trial on the merits.29
Rather, during the extradition hearing the judicial body first deter
mines whether the extradition request is within the bounds of the
treaty between the requesting nation and the United States. Fol
lowing this conclusion, the court must then decide whether there is
enough evidence to require surrender of the accused to the request
ing nation. 30 When making this determination, the judicial body
does not determine whether the accused is guilty or innocent. 31
Rather, the judicial body only asks whether probable cause exists to
believe the accused committed the offense charged, or whether the
accused has already been convicted of the offense in the other na
tion.32 If the judicial body makes an affirmative determination with
regard to either question, the accused will be certified for extradi
tion. 33 Before certification, however, the accused may introduce
any "defense" he or she may have against extradition. 34
See id.; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 23 at 655.
See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461 (1913) ("The proceeding is not a
trial."); see also Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 463 (1888) ("[T]he proceeding
before the Uudicial body] is not to be regarded as in the nature of a final trial by which
the prisoner could be convicted or acquitted of the crime charged against him ....").
30. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (stating that the judicial body will
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions
of the applicable treaty); see also Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 314-16 (1922) (stating
that an extradition hearing merely decides whether there is competent evidence which,
according to the law of the surrendering nation, would justify the accused's apprehen
sion and commitment for trial if the crime had been committed in the surrendering
nation); BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 655-56.
31. See Collins, 259 U.S. at 314-15 (stating that it is not the function of the com
mitting magistrate to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee);
Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461 (explaining that the issue in an international extradition hear
ing is limited to whether the evidence is sufficient to make it proper to hold that party
for trial); In re Extradition of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) ("The
function of the Uudicial body] is not to determine whether the alleged fugitive is in fact
guilty of the crime of which he is accused."); BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 703.
32. See Ex parte Bryant, 167 U.S. 104, 105 (1897) (explaining that the requesting
nation must show that "there was probable cause to believe him guilty of the crime
charged"); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971) ("The
existence of probable cause ... to believe the accused [is] guilty of the crime charged is
essential to the issuance of a commitment [to extradition]."); Hall, supra note 23, at
602-03.
33. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The certification provides that a
warrant shall issue for the commitment of the accused to the proper jail until he is
surrendered upon demand of the foreign government. See id.
34. The Supreme Court has ruled that in an international extradition proceeding
the potential extraditee may only submit evidence to rebut the requesting nation's case,
as opposed to putting on a full defense. See Charlton, 229 U.S. at 461-62 (excluding
28.
29.
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If the judicial body determines that the accused is not extradit

able, the United States, who acts on behalf of the requesting nation,
has no direct route of appeal, but may refile the request to extra
dite. 35 Conversely, if the judicial body determines that the accused
is to be certified for extradition, the accused may not appeal in the
usual sense, but may obtain limited review of the certification for
extradition by way of a writ of habeas corpUS. 36 Notwithstanding
this review, if the accused remains extraditable, the judicial body
evidence of insanity); United States v. Wiebe, 733 F.2d 549, 553 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984)
(noting that defenses of alibi or insanity may be excluded); United States ex rei. Pe
trushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1963) (excluding evidence that contra
dicts the time of the murder). But see John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States
Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441,1468-71 (1988) (debunking the myth that a person
sought for extradition may not put on a defense).
Generally, defenses to extradition include a lapse of the statute of limitations for
the offense charged, double jeopardy, immunity from prosecution, or a "political of
fense" exception. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. See generally BASSIOUNI,
supra note 23, at 495-502. Commonly, a "political offense" exception is provided for in
the treaty. Usually, this exception bars extradition when the person sought is being
persecuted by the requesting nation merely based on his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions, or will be 'prejudiced at trial or restricted in his liberty because of the
same. The "clear and longstanding" definition of a political offense recognizes a polit
ical offense to be an "'act[ 1 committed in the course of and incidental to a violent
political disturbance such as war, revolution or rebellion.'" Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F.
Supp 904, 911 (D. Mass. 1990) (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir.
1981)); see also Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 511 (1896). See generally Gosser, supra
note 6, at 636-40 (discussing the history and case law surrounding the political offense
exception); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradi
tion Between the U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among
Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 255 (1987) (explaining
changes to the political offense exception in the treaty at issue in Kirby).
35. See Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426 (1923) (holding that an extradition pro
ceeding that ends in the potential extraditee's release from custody does not bar a sub
sequent extradition demand on the same charge); In re Requested Extradition of
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The foreign government that is dissatisfied
with the results 'of the hearing must institute a new request for extradition. "). Multiple
requests for the extradition of the accused must, however, be filed in good faith. See
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir. 1978).
36. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating
that habeas corpus review of an extradition decision is limited to "'whether the magis
trate had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a some
what liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that
there was reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty''') (quoting Fernandez v.
Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d
Cir. 1973) (recognizing that the magistrate's decision is not appealable, but that the
extraditee may obtain review by"way of a writ of habeas corpus). See generally, BAS
SIOUNI, supra note 23, at 737-49; Hall, supra note 23, at 603. Black's Law Dictionary
defines habeas corpus ad subjiciendum as:
A writ directed to the person detaining another, and commanding him to pro
duce the body of the prisoner, or person detained. This is the most common
form of habeas corpus writ, the purpose of which is to test the legality of the
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that made the decision to extradite will certify its decision to the
Secretary of State, who exercises discretionary review of extradition
decisions. 37 Following the certification for extradition, the Secre
tary of State can order the surrender of the accused. 38 If surrender
does not occur within two months of certification for extradition,
the accused may be released. 39
2.

Bail Decisions During the Extradition Process

Currently, there are no statutory provisions concerning bail in
extradition cases. 40 Rather, the United States Supreme Court, in
detention or the imprisonment; not whether he is guilty or innocent. This writ
is guaranteed by the U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, and by state constitutions.
BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY 709-10 (6th ed. 1990).
37. See 18 U.S.c. §§ 3184, 3186 (1994 & Supp. II 1996); see also Escobedo, 623
F.2d at 1105 & n.20 (stating that a fugitive is not generally entitled to review by the
Secretary of State on the propriety of the extradition, but that the Secretary of State
always has discretion to refuse to extradite); Collier v. Vaccaro, 51 F.2d 17, 20 (4th Cir.
1931) ("Notwithstanding the discharge of the writ [of habeas corpus], the Secretary of
State may review the evidence before the magistrate and decide whether the case
presented is one calling for the surrender of the accused to [foreign authorities]."). Typ
ically, the Secretary of State will not deny extradition. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at
776; see also Hall, supra note 23, at 603 & n.25; Note, Executive Discretion in Extradi
tion,62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1328-29 (1962) (noting that in the twenty-one years prior
to 1962, the Secretary of State denied extradition after certification only twice). How
ever, the Secretary of State may narrow the terms of the 'extradition approved by the
magistrate. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 906 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[W]e have no
doubt that the Secretary of State could, if he wished, narrow the terms of extradition
approved by the magistrate ....").
38. See 18 U.S.c. § 3186 (1994) ("The Secretary of State may order the person
committed ... to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government
....").
39. See id. § 3188, which states:
Whenever any person who is committed for rendition to a foreign government
to remain until delivered up ... is not so delivered up and conveyed out of the
United States within two calendar months after such commitment ... any
judge of the United States, or of any State, upon application made to him by
or on behalf of the person so committed ... may order the person so commit
ted to be discharged out of custody . . . .
Id.; see also In re Extradition of Barrett, 590 F.2d 624, 626 (6th Cir. 1978) (agreeing with
the district court that the two month time period begins to run when the order commit
ting the extraditee to jail to wait for extradition is entered, but also recognizing that the
enforcement language of the statute is not in mandatory terms).
40. See In re Extradition of Rovelli, 977 F. Supp. 566, 567 (D. Conn. 1997) (rely
ing on Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903), for the power to grant bail in special cir
cumstances); In re Extradition of Sutton, 898 F. Supp. 691, 693-94 (E.D. Mo. 1995)
(recognizing that federal statutes governing extradition do not include a bail provision,
that the Bail Reform Act does not apply to international extradition cases, and that
courts must instead rely on federal common law); see also Nathaniel A. Persily, Note,
International Extradition and the Right to Bail, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 407 (1998) (explain
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Wright v. Henkel,41 vested the power to grant bail in international
extradition cases with the courtS.42 The standard set forth by the
Court in Wright v. Henkel allows bail requests to be granted in in
ternational extradition cases only where "special circumstances"
exist.43
ing the development of the right to bail in international extradition cases and arguing
that federal legislation should be used to clarify the federal courts' power to grant bail).
41. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
42. See id. at 63 ("[W]e are unwilling to hold that the Circuit Courts possess no
power in respect of admitting to bail other than as specifically vested by statute, or that,
while bail should not ordinarily be granted in cases of foreign extradition, those courts
may not in any case, and whatever the special circumstances, extend that relief."); In re
Mitchell, 171 F. 289, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (stating that the power to grant bail should be
exercised only in "most pressing circumstances"); see also Kester, supra note 34, at
1447-50 (debunking the myth that bail is not available in international extradition
cases).
Many times a magistrate judge presides over extradition hearings, including ruling
or adopting findings on the issue of whether bail should be granted. See In re Extradi
tion of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1216 (5th Cir. 1986) (denying bail); In re Extradition of
Morales, 906 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (same); In re Extradition of Sidali,
868 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D.N.I. 1994) (same); In re Extradition of Heilbronn, 773 F. Supp.
1576, 1576, 1582 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (same). But see United States v. Taitz, 130 F.R.D.
442, 443 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (admitting bail).
43. See Wright, 190 U.S. at 63; see also Salerno v. United States, 878 F.2d 317, 317
(9th Cir. 1989) ("Examples of such circumstances include the raising of substantial
claims upon which the appellant [extraditee] has a high probability of success [in avoid
ing extradition], a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated, and unusual delay
in the appeal process."); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981)
(finding special circumstances and granting bail where the extraditee was a juvenile and
no suitable holding facility could be found); Morales, 906 F. Supp. at 1374-75 (finding
special circumstances and granting bail when, after being held for six months, the
United States dismissed the original complaint at the request of the foreign govern
ment, and then filed a new complaint, thereby delaying conclusion of the matter); Taitz,
130 F.R.D. at 445-47 (finding special circumstances and granting bail where the absence
of flight risk was added to the need for lengthy hearings, the lack of a criminal record,
severe allergies that would be adversely affected by custody, an inability to carry out
religious rituals at the correctional facility, and a lack of diplomatic necessity for deny
ing bail).
The "special circumstances" standard is relatively strict. See In re Extradition of
Mainero, 950 F. Supp. 290, 294 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("A person subject to international
extradition may overcome the presumption against bail by presenting clear and con
vincing evidence demonstrating 'special circumstances' justifying release ....") (quot
ing In re Extradition of Nacif-Borge, 829 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (D. Nev. 1993»; In re
Mitchell, 171 F. at 289 (stating that the power to grant bail "should be exercised only in
the most pressing circumstances," as in this case where the extraditee was arrested on
the eve of a civil case involving his entire fortune). As a result, many times courts deny
bail when the circumstances are not deemed special enough to warrant bail. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524-25 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that the record
does not establish either probability of success or likelihood of protracted extradition
proceedings due to impending change in sovereignty in Hong Kong); In Re Extradition
of Russell, 805 F.2d at 1217 (denying bail despite pending civil litigation, complexity of
the pending extradition proceedings, criminal trial in Columbia, no risk of flight, and

1999]

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION GRANTS OF BAIL

573

When a bail request is denied either by a magistrate or a judge,
the potential extraditee may seek release through the use of a writ
of habeas corpus. 44 Conversely, when a bail request is granted, if it
is granted by a magistrate as opposed to a district court judge, ap
peal by the United States on behalf of the requesting country lies to
the district court. 45 However, if the bail request is granted by a
district court judge, the United States, acting on behalf of the repotentially severe financial and emotional hardship on extraditee and his family);
United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1986) (denying bail despite slow
arrest by treaty parties, where potential extraditee had already been detained for one
month and was entitled to his liberty after sixty days of detainment absent proper docu
mentation and requirements for extradition); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914,
915 (1st Cir. 1979) (denying bail notwithstanding the fact that the accused's brother,
who faced an extradition hearing on the same charge, was released in another district);
In re Extradition of Rovelli, 977 F. Supp. at 569-70 (denying bail notwithstanding the
fact that Swiss authorities chose not to extradite the extraditee's mother on a similar
charge, the extraditee claimed a need to consult with his attorneys, and the extraditee's
willingness to convert his home into a secure detention facility and wear an electronic
monitoring device); In re Extradition of Sutton, 898 F. Supp. at 694-95 (denying bail
despite delay, lack of risk of flight, and fact that offense was bailable in the country
requesting extradition); In re Extradition of Siegmund, 887 F. Supp. 1383, 1386-87 (D.
Nev. 1995) (denying bail despite no flight risk, bailable offense in requesting country,
nature of offense [fraudulent bankruptcy], and possibility that extraditee was in custody
for ninety days while awaiting extradition); In re Extradition of Sidali, 868 F. Supp. at
658-59 (denying bail after finding that probability of success in avoiding extradition at
hearing and extraordinary personal character were outweighed by the gravity of the
offense); In re Extradition of Rouvier, 839 F. Supp. 537, 541-42 (N.D. III. 1993) (deny
ing bail notwithstanding current ties to United States, heart condition, no risk of flight,
claim that statements made to American court regarding extraditee's foreign criminal
action were false, and extraditee's compliance with all required legal procedures when
he left France); In re Extradition of Hamilton-Byrne, 831 F. Supp. 287, 290-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (denying bail despite health problems that were not so unique that
they could not be dealt with in custody); In re Extradition of Heilbronn, 773 F. Supp. at
1581-82 (denying bail despite no flight risk, delay allegedly caused by Israel, and release
would benefit the public because extraditee is a doctor); United States v. Hills, 765 F.
Supp. 381, 386-88 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (disallowing bail despite absence of flight risk,
extraditee's involvement in civil litigation, need to assist his attorney, and constitutional
and procedural defenses raised at extradition hearing); Koskotas v. Roche, 740 F. Supp.
904, 908 (D. Mass. 1990) (disallowing bail despite extraditee's need to be involved in
counsel's preparation for extradition proceedings, ongoing pro se defense in civil action
in New York that involved most of his assets, and extraditee's willingness to submit
himself to house arrest).
44. See Leitner, 784 F.2d at 160 (affirming the decision of the district court to
deny habeas relief after magistrate granted bail); Koskotas, 740 F. Supp. at 919 (denying
habeas relief after magistrate denied bail).
45. See In re Extradition of Rouvier, 839 F. Supp. at 537 (hearing emergency
motion brought by the United States Attorney when the magistrate granted bail). This
Note does not address whether United States District Courts may hear appeals from
grants of bail by United States magistrates. Rather, the analysis in this Note is confined
to the issue of whether grants of bail by the district courts are reviewable by the courts
of appeals.
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questing nation, has no avenue to obtain review of the bail decision
unless jurisdiction exists in the courts of appeals. 46
In domestic criminal cases, as opposed to international extradi
tion cases, appellate review of grants of bail was not available until
jurisdiction was conferred by federal statute. An examination of
the availability of appellate review of bail decisions in domestic
criminal cases will prove helpful in understanding this Note's final
analysis.
B.

Review of Grants of Bail in Domestic Criminal Cases

In domestic criminal cases, appellate review of district court
decisions is conferred by federal statute. Although uncommon,
parties in domestic criminal cases may invoke the jurisdiction pro
vided by 28 U.S.c. § 1291.47 More frequently, the government
takes criminal appeals pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act, 18
U.S.c. § 3731. 48
The provision of § 3731 that is most germane to the issue of
46. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 858 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that
there is no Supreme Court precedent determining the issue of whether the United
States has the right to appeal from a district court order granting bail).
47. 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). See infra Part 1.C.1 through Part 1.C.2 for a detailed
discussion of § 1291.
48. 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994). Section 3731 provides the following:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of
appeals from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an
indictment or information or granting a new trial after verdict or judgment, as
to anyone or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution.
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a
decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or re
quiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after
the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an
indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district
court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is
a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a deci
sion or order, entered by a district court of the United States, granting the release
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense, or denying a motion for
revocation of, or modification of the conditions of, a decision or order granting
release.
The appeal in all such cases shall be taken within thirty days after the
decision, judgment or order has been rendered and shall be diligently
prosecuted.
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its
purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
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whether bail decisions made by district judges in international ex
tradition cases may be reviewed provides the government with the
right to appeal an adverse bail decision, i.e. one that releases the
defendant on bail, made by a district court judge in a domestic
criminal case. 49 When the bail decision is made in a domestic crimi
nal case by a magistrate, or by any person other than a judge of the
court having original jurisdiction, not including a federal appellate
court, the government's right to appeal is set forth in 18 U.S.c.
§ 3145. 50

Since there is no parallel statutory provision that provides the
government with the right to appeal an adverse bail ruling in an
international extradition matter, if jurisdiction is to lie, it must be
found elsewhere. Hence, an inquiry into the jurisdictional require
ment the United States must meet in order to obtain review by the
courts of appeals is necessary.
C.

Jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals

The basic jurisdictional provisions for the federal courts of ap
peals are presently found within 28 U.S.c. § 1291, which embodies
the finality requirement, also known as the "final judgment rule. "51
Section 1291 states that "[t]he courts of appeals ... shall have juris
diction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courtS."52
The following section describes the history of the finality require
ment now found in § 1291.
1. History of the Jurisdiction Granted to the Courts
of Appeals
The final judgment rule originated

ill

English common law

49. See id.
50. 18 V.S.c. § 3145 (1994). The relevant provision of § 3145 provides the
following:
(a) REVIEW OF A RELEASE ORDER-If a person is ordered re
leased by a magistrate, or by a person other than a judge of a court having
original jurisdiction over the offense and other than a Federal appellate
court
(1) the attorney for the Government may file, with the court having origi
nal jurisdiction over the offense, a motion for revocation of the order or
amendment of the conditions of release; and
(2) the person may file, with the court having original jurisdiction over
the offense, a motion for amendment of the conditions of release.

Id.
51. 28 V.S.c. § 1291 (1994); see also Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75
L. REv. 351, 353 (1961) (describing finality requirement of § 1291).
52. 28 V.S.c. § 1291 (1994).

HARV.
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where a writ of error53 would provide for review, but only of a final
decision. 54 The Judiciary Act of 1789, which established the United
States federal court system, introduced the final judgment rule into
the American federal court system. 55 Three sections of the Judici
ary Act contained the language of finality now found in § 1291.56
53. A writ of error is:
A writ issued from a court of appellate jurisdiction, directed to the judge or
judges of a court of record, requiring them to remit to the appellate court the
record of an action before them, in which a final judgment has been entered,
in order that examination may be made of certain errors alleged to have been
committed, and that the judgment may be reversed, corrected, or affirmed, as
the case may require.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1610 (6th ed. 1990); see also Winchester v. Winn, 29 S.W.2d
188, 190 (Mo. 1930) ("The suing out of a writ of error is the commencement of a new
suit to annul and set aside the judgment of the court below and is not a continuation of
the suit below to which it relates.").
54. See 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE
DURE § 3906 (2d ed. 1992); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by
Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 717, 726-29 (1993)
("[T]hat the Americans borrowed the final judgment rule from the English writ of error
procedure is a virtual certainty.").
55. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The final judgment rule as em
bodied in the Judiciary Act of 1789 can be traced to the English common law where a
final decision on an entire matter had to be obtained before appellate review could be
had in the form of the writ of error. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891). In
McLish, Justice Lamar stated, "[i]t is true that the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited the
appellate jurisdiction of this court to final judgments and decrees, in the cases specified.
This, however, in respect to writs of error was only declaratory of a well settled and
ancient rule of English practice." Id. at 665. In fact, the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided
for review on writ of error directly to the Supreme Court of "final decrees" in maritime
and admiralty cases from federal circuit courts. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73,
§§ 21-22; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3906, at 264 (explaining the origin of
the final judgment rule); Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment as A Basis for Appeal,
41 YALE L.J. 539, 540-44 (1932) (same). See generally Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49 (1923), for a
discussion of the legislative process that enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789.
56. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789). The three sections state:
[Section 21: F]rom final decrees in a district court in causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of
three hundred dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the
next circuit court ....
[Section 22: F]inal decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court,
where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive
of costs, may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court ...
upon a writ of error ... [a]nd upon a like process, may final judgments and
decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in a circuit court ... where the
matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive
of costs, be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court ....
[Section 25: A] final judgment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law
or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had ... may be re
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These three sections provided the ability to appeal a district court
decision to the circuit court or Supreme Court, but only from a "fi
nal decree" in admiralty, or a "final judgment" or "final decree" in
law or equity.57 The legislative history surrounding the period in
which the Judiciary Act was adopted is limited; consequently, the
Framers' reasons for limiting the federal courts' jurisdiction in this
way are unclear. 58
In 1891, the Evarts Act created the federal courts of appeals. 59
Similar to the judiciary Act's grant of jurisdiction, the Evarts Act
granted power to the newly created courts of appeals to review "by
appeal or writ of error final decision[s] in the district court. "60 The
Supreme Court declared that the different terminology, "judgments
and decrees" as used in the Judiciary Act and "decisions" as used in
the Evarts Act, amounted to the same restriction on appellate juris
diction. 61 Currently, the finality requirement is codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1291.62 The following section describes the difficulty the
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States
upon a writ of error ....
Id.
57. See id.
58. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 46 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789). Reports of the
debates surrounding the establishment of the court system are very sparse. For exam
ple, one report states only that "Mr. Lee, on behalf of the committee therein appointed,
reported a bill to establish the judicial courts of the United States." Id. Another re
port, mirroring others in terms of meagerness, states "[p]roceeded to the second read
ing of the bill to establish the judicial courts of the United States; and, after progress,
adjourned." Id. at 47. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3906, at 264
("History provides clear sources for the final judgment requirement, and no clear justi
fication. As a result, history furnishes little useful guide for understanding or applying
the requirement today."); Crick, supra note 55, at 548-49 (commenting on sparseness of
legislative history); Warren, supra note 55, at 49 (explaining that the legislative history
from this period is sparse, thereby rendering the Framers' reasons for limiting the
courts of appeals' jurisdiction elusive).
59. See Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). Section 2 of this Act created the
federal courts of appeals and provided for the appointment of an additional circuit
judge in each circuit. See id. § 2. The newly created courts of appeals were to be com
posed of three judges who would be drawn from the existing judgeships. See id. The
Judicial Code of 1911 formally abolished the old circuit courts. See Act of March 3,
1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167. The Judicial Code also provided for judgeships
so that the newly created courts of appeals would be staffed with its own judges. See id.
§ 118.
60. See Evarts Act, 26 Stat. at 828, § 6.
61. See Ex parte Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36 (1920). In Ex parte Tiffany, the Supreme
Court stated "[t]he words: 'final decisions in the district courts' mean the same thing as
'final judgments and decrees' as used in former acts regulating appellate jurisdiction."
Id.
62. 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994).
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interpreting
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finality

Defining the Finality Requirement

Discussing the problem of defining the finality required by
§ 1291, the Supreme Court63 has noted that the cases on finality
"are not altogether harmonious."64 While the language of finality
had been around for some time, it was not until 1945 that the
Supreme Court, in Catlin v. United States ,65 offered a general defini
tion of a final decision. 66 The Supreme Court proclaimed that a
final decision is "one which ends the litigation on the merits and
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."67
With this authoritative judicial pronouncement, the Court appeared
to have defined finality.68
Nevertheless, the Court eschewed its own definition whenever
necessary to reach the desired result. For example, in Cohen v.
63. Many of the opinions that attempt to define finality are found in cases where
a party is seeking Supreme Court review of a state court decision. Jurisdiction over
these claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1257, also hinges on finality. See 28 U.S.c. § 1257
(1994) ("Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State ... may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari. ..."). However, the Supreme
Court apparently considers a "final judgment" to be the same in either § 1257 cases or
§ 1291 cases, and the Supreme Court often interchanges precedents which have at
tempted to define this requirement. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
478 n.7 (1975) (determining whether a state court decision was final for purposes of
appeal and citing decisions concerning finality of district court decisions for review by
courts of appeals); Local No. 438 Constr. & Gen. Laborers' Union v. Curry, 371 U.S.
542,549 (1963) (same); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 309-11 (1962)
(determining what constituted a final judgment within the meaning of the Expediting
Act and citing two cases concerning appeals to the courts of appeals under § 1291, and a
third concerning an appeal to the Supreme Court under § 1257).
64. See McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 545 (1892); see
also Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (1920) (holding that judgment should be final as
to all parties, causes of action, and entire subject matter involved before appeal); St.
Louis, Iron Co. v. Southern Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28 (1883) (reasoning that decree
is final for purposes of appeal when it terminates the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing to be done but enforce the decree).
65. 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
66. See id. at 233; see also Martineau, supra note 54, at 729 (noting surprise that
the Court did not "develop a general definition of final judgment" for quite some time,
and citing Catlin as the case that finally did).
67. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233.
68. See John C. Nagel, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Juris
prudence With Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 203-04 (1994) (noting the "bat
tle" between the competing policies for and against interlocutory appeals and
acknowledging that the Court "settle[d] the controversy in favor of precluding interloc
utory appeals" with the definition announced in Catlin).
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Beneficial Loan Corp. ,69 the Supreme Court permitted the appeal
of an order requiring the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit
to post security for the reasonable expenses of the defendant if the
plaintiff was unsuccessful in the suit.7° Surely, this order did not fit
into the definition set forth in Catlin; however, the Cohen Court
relied on past cases where the finality requirement was given a
"practical rather than technical construction" and proceeded to
provide review.7 1
In Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,72 the Supreme Court
relied on Cohen and stressed that "a decision 'final' within the
meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible
to be made in a case."73 The Court then adopted a balancing ap
proach which required weighing the inconvenience and costs of in
terlocutory74 review against the danger of denying justice by
delaying the appeal until after final judgment.75 The Gillespie doc
trine, if adhered to, could have ended much of the debate surround
ing the final judgment rule because it gave discretion in determining
which orders merit appellate review through the balancing test.
However, the doctrine has been criticized. 76
Attesting to the lack of a concrete definition for "finality," the
69. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
70. See id.
71. See id. at 546 (collecting cases).
72. 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964) ("[W]hether a ruling is 'final' within the meaning of
§ 1291 is frequently so close a question that decision of that issue either way can be
supported with equally forceful arguments, and ... it is impossible to devise a formula
to resolve all marginal cases coming within what might well be called the 'twilight zone'
of finality.").
73. Id. at 152 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545
(1949)). See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 306 (1962); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338
U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukie R.R., 67 U.S. (2 Black) 524,
531 (1862); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 203 (1848).
74. The term interlocutory is defined as "[p]rovisional; interim; temporary; not
final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 815 (6th ed. 1990); see also In re Merle's Inc., 481 F.2d 1016,
1018 (9th Cir. 1973) ("An interlocutory order or decree is one which does not finally
determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter pertaining to the
cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to
adjudicate the cause on the merits.").
75. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53.
76. See Randall J. Thrk, Note, Toward a More Rational Final Judgment Rule: A
Proposal to Amend 28 U.S.c. § 1292, 67 GEO. L.J. 1025,1034 (1979); see also Martin H.
Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L.
REv. 89, 118 (1975) ("The Court's opinion in Gillespie is astounding for its clouded
reasoning and enigmatic conclusions. It is unfortunate that a decision which may repre
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Supreme Court, in 1974, stated that "no verbal formula yet devised
can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or pro
vide an utterly reliable guide for the future."77 Yet, despite the
problems encountered by the courts when defining finality, the fi
nality requirement remains. Therefore, in order to better under
stand why the finality requirement and its opposition persist, the
following sections explain the benefits of appeals in general, the
policies supporting the appealability of final judgments only, and
the countervailing policies that support interlocutory appeals.
3. The Value of Appeals in General
Appeals serve a number of positive objectives. 78 Appeals fur
ther the goal of rendering factually and legally correct decisions by
adding another layer of scrutiny.79 In addition, appeals contribute
to a fairer judicial process by allowing review of the constraints
placed on a litigant by what would otherwise be an unreviewable
court. 80 The larger debate, however, is centered around the appro
priate time for an appeal to be taken. One viewpoint is that appeals
should be delayed until after a final judgment has been entered,
while the opposing viewpoint is that sometimes interlocutory ap
peals are necessary.

a.

Policies supporting appeals after final judgment

Despite the dissatisfaction expressed by some toward the final
ity requirement, several policies justify its use. 81 The following sec
tion describes the policies that support the finality requirement.
sent a truly significant adjustment of the entire philosophy of appealability is so devoid
of any persuasive analysis.").
77. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
78. See Solimine, infra note 86, at 1175-80 (arguing that less judicial hostility to
ward interlocutory appeals is needed because interlocutory appeals serve a number of
positive goals).
79. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Role of Reason in the Rule of Law, 56 U.
DIl. L. REv. 779, 799 (1989) (arguing that "the justification for appeals is not necessar
ily the 'correct' result they may produce, but their tendency to encourage reasoned
judgment by subjecting it to reexamination"). But see Judith Resnik, Precluding Ap
peals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 606 (1985) (quoting former United States Solicitor
General Rex Lee "who stated that 'there is nothing in the Constitution and nothing in
common sense that says that decisions of an appellate court are more likely to be right
than a district court"').
80. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seri
ously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 66-67 (1985) (explaining that fairness manifests itself in
appeals).
81. See Note, supra note 51, at 351-53 (describing several policies supporting fi
nality requirement); see also Joseph Mitzel, Note, When is an Order Final?: A Result
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The finality requirement helps prevent overburdened
dockets

While overburdened dockets may not have been a concern in
1789 when the judiciary Act was first adopted, the finality require
ment of § 1291 has been praised as a way of easing the burden on
the dockets of the courts of appeals. 82 The finality requirement
reduces the number of appeals by preventing piecemeal review,
which is the review of anyone decision in a single case before com
pletion of the trial phase. 83 Piecemeal review of each decision
made within a single case is unnecessary because most decisions can
be effectively reviewed after the trial phase is completed. 84 When
all of the issues are then reviewed in one appeal, the number of
appeals overall will decline. Consequently, the burden on the dock
ets of the appellate courts is lessened.
n.

The finality requirement promotes judicial efficiency

The concern with piecemeal review during the era in which the
Judiciary Act was enacted centered around administrative difficulOriented Approach to the Finality Requirement for Bankruptcy Appeals to Federal Cir
cuit Courts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 1337,1341-42 (1990) (same).
82. Guarding against overburdening was not one of the main concerns in England
at the time the rule came into existence. In fact, it was not until 1830 that the United
States Supreme Court began to acknowledge the rule for this purpose. Justice Story, in
Canter v. American Insurance Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830), stated:
It is of great importance to the due administration of justice, and is in further
ance of the manifest intention of the legislature, in giving appellate jurisdiction
to this court upon final decrees only, that causes should not come up here in
fragments, upon successive appeals. It would occasion very great delays, and
oppressive expenses.
Id. at 318.
The Canter Court then found that since the circuit court did not address damages,
and the party seeking damages did not cross appeal, this issue was "not now open
before this court." Id.; see also Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 205 (1848)
(stating that "it was obviously the object of the law to save the unnecessary expense and
delay of repeated appeals in the same suit"); United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
267,273 (1835) (finding that repeated appeals would waste resources and cause delay
and noting that "Congress did not intend to expose suitors to this inconvenience"). See
generally Crick, supra note 55, at 544, 550.
83. This is especially true in light of the fact that subsequent rulings may moot the
requirement of appeal. For example, if a party that would have appealed a ruling then
wins the case, he no longer needs the appeal to vindicate his rights. See Stringfellow v.
Concerned Neighbors in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 380 (1987); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 54, § 3907, at 273-74.
84. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at 272; see also Gillespie v. United
States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964) (balancing "the inconvenience and costs
of piecemeal review ... and the danger of denying justice by delay").
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ties, as opposed to overburdened dockets. 85 Today, the finality re
quirement increases efficiency in the judicial system by eliminating
the delays that would occur if every ruling was subject to interlocu
tory review. 86 In addition, the finality requirement aids judicial effi
ciency by ensuring that the appellate court receives a full record, as
opposed to one which is not yet complete. 87 Also, the finality re
quirement increases judicial efficiency by keeping counsel as well as
the court familiar with the case because the chance of interruptions
for appeals is diminished. 88 Furthermore, the finality requirement
promotes efficiency because it decreases the possibility of mis
placed evidence, which could occur if piecemeal review were
undertaken. 89
111.

The finality requirement enhances the judicial process

In addition to easing the burden on the courts' dockets and
increasing judicial efficiency, the finality requirement enhances the
judicial process. A common criticism of interlocutory appeals is
that such appeals decrease respect for the trial judge.90 The finality
requirement lowers the number of interlocutory appeals, thus en
85. See Crick, supra note 55, at 541-43 (discussing the problems of having the
"record" in two separate courts at the same time).
86. See Gillespie, 379 U.S. at 152-53 (stating that there is a "danger of denying
justice by delay"); Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945) (stating that elimina
tion of delay caused by interlocutory review is reason enough to sustain final judgment
limitation); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
504 (3d ed. 1976) (stating that "[i]nterlocutory appeals add to the delay of litigation");
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1165, 1179 (1990) (stating that "permitting more interlocutory appeals
will indeed cause delay of the proceedings").
87. See Crick, supra note 55, at 541-43; see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304,
309 (1995) (noting that interlocutory appeal "risks additional, and unnecessary, appel
late court work ... when it presents appellate courts with less developed records");
Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 147 U.S. 337, 341 (1893) (stating "[t]he case is not to
be sent up in fragments"); Note, supra note 51, at 352 ("A single appeal consolidating
all alleged errors also minimizes the appellate court burden by eliminating more than
one set of records, briefs and arguments.").
88. See Mitzel, supra note 81, at 1342.
89. See id. at 1341-42.
90. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981) ("Per
mitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as
well as the special role that individual plays in our judicial system."); Riyaz A. Kanji,
The Proper Scope of Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction in the Collateral Order Context, 100
YALE L.J. 511, 512 (1990) ("The constant specter of such review would reduce the dis
trict judge to a token figure."); Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 661 (1971); Charles A. Wright,
The DOUbtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-80 (1957).
But see Paul D. Carrington, The Power o/District Judges and the Responsibility of
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suring continued respect for the trial judge. The finality require
ment also enhances the judicial process by highlighting the trial
judge as the decision-maker when issues arise at trial.91 The finality
requirement further enhances the judicial process by safeguarding
poorer opponents from harassment by richer opponents, who can
afford to take endless appeals. 92
Despite the many policies supporting the finality requirement,
interlocutory appeals also prove beneficial and serve valuable pur
poses. The following section sets forth the benefits of interlocutory
appeals.

b.

Policies supporting interlocutory appeals

Interlocutory appeals provide review of decisions that will
meld into the final judgment and will be effectively unreviewable,
such as a denial of removal to state court or a refusal to grant sum
mary judgment.93 Furthermore, interlocutory appeals aid courts of
appeals in supervising trial court actions that may not be reviewable
on an appeal from a final judgment.94 In light of the above policies,
several mechanisms that provide for interlocutory appeals have
been created. These mechanisms circumvent the final judgment
rule toward the end of allowing interlocutory review. An under
standing of these mechanisms is essential to a proper determination
of whether bail decisions in international extradition cases may be
reviewed. The following section describes mechanisms for ob
taining interlocutory review which, by their very nature, bypass the
final judgment rule.
Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REv. 507, 513 (1969) ("Only a venal or unduly timid judge
should fear or regret review, insofar as the esteem of his office is concerned.").
91. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 449 U.S. at 374 ("[The finality requirement]
emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual
initially called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the
course of a trial.").
92. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (recognizing that
the finality requirement is a way of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would
come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from
the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of
judgment"); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at 272; Wright, supra note
90, at 780 (arguing that an injured person of limited means may settle for a smaller
recovery of damages rather than wait for an appeal to be determined).
93. See Redish, supra note 76, at 98 (explaining that a litigant may be substan
tially burdened physically, financially, and emotionally in the preparation and conduct
of a trial if review, which might negate the need for that trial, is delayed).
94. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 411 (1982) (ex
plaining that a judge who assumes a managerial role exercises broad discretion, en
joying unreviewable discretion in most decisions).
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Avenues of Review Which Circumvent the Finality
Requirement95

The following section is comprised of sub-sections that de
scribe avenues of review that circumvent the finality requirement
including: (a) 28 U.S.c. § 1292, (b) Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, (c) the collateral order doctrine, and (d) the All
Writs Act.
a.

Section 1292

Section 1292 of Title 28 of the United States Code, created by
the Interlocutory Appeals Act, consists of several provisions that
provide for interlocutory appellate review. 96 Section 1292(a)(1)
grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over orders of district
courts relating to injunctive relief. 97 The Supreme Court has lim
ited this section, despite its expansive appearance. 98 Similarly,
§ 1292(a)(2) and (3) grant jurisdiction over appeals of interlocutory
95. Other avenues of obtaining interlocutory review that are not discussed in
depth in this Note include: the Forgay-Conrad rule, the appeal of attorney fees orders,
the appeal of bankruptcy orders, the death knell doctrine, the appeal of stay orders, and
provisions set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act that are now codified at 9 U.S.c.
§ 16 (1994). See Martineau, supra note 54, at 734-46. The Forgay-Conrad rule allows
appeals when a court orders a transfer of property, yet retains jurisdiction for
accounting purposes. See Forgay v. Conrad 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201, 204 (1848). The
Supreme Court adopted a rule separating appealability of attorney fees from
appealability of final judgment on the merits orders in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson &
Co., 486 U.S. 196,202 (1988). Appeals of bankruptcy orders are governed by 28 U.S.c.
§'158(d) (1994), which provides jurisdiction to courts of appeals over "all final
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees" entered by district courts. However, the
courts use a flexible approach providing for appeals from non-final orders. See
Martineau, supra note 54, at 745-46. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), the Supreme Court set forth a narrow exception
to the final judgment rule such that any stay of a federal case pending resolution of state
court proceedings is immediately appealable. See id. at 10. Since both the federal and
the state claim involved the same issue, the plaintiff would have been barred from the
federal court by res judicata, and as a result would never have been able to pursue the
federal claim. See id. Finally, § 16 provides for immediate appeal from an interlocutory
order that does not favor arbitration. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.c. § 16 (1994).
96. Interlocutory Appeals Act, 28 U.S.c. § 1292 (1994).
97. See id. § 1292(a)(1). The text of § 1292(a)(1) states that courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or mod
ify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court ...."

Id.
98. See Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981) (holding that for an
interlocutory appeal to be immediately appealable under § 1292(a)(1), a litigant must
show that the order might have serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences and can only
be effectively challenged by immediate appeal); Switzerland Cheese Assoc. v. E.
Home's Mkt., Inc., 385 U.S. 23 (1966) (holding that an order denying summary judg
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orders that appoint receivers or refuse to wind up receiverships,
and over decrees in admiralty cases. 99 However, § 1292(a)(2) and
(3) do not provide the basis for a significant number of interlocu
tory appeals. lOO
In addition to § 1292(a) and its sub-parts, § 1292(b) provides
for discretionary review by the courts of appeals of orders that are
deemed by a district court judge to involve "a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin
ion" the resolution of which, in an immediate appeal, "may materi
ally advance the termination of the litigation."I01 Courts of appeals
may permit an appeal from an order of this type only if an "applica
tion is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order."I02 In
addition, the application for such appeal "shall not stay proceedings
in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals
or a judge thereof shall so order."lo3 Although appearing to pro
vide for many interlocutory appeals, § 1292(b) has been construed·
very strictly, and as a result, is not often the basis for interlocutory
review,l04
Section 1292(c) and (d) do not-provide means for obtaining
interlocutory review by the courts of appeals despite the final judg
ment rule.lOS Rather, they describe the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the process of appealing pro
ceedings from the Court of International Trade or the Claims Court
to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 106 Since § 1292(c)
and (9) do not concern the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to
review bail decisions in international extradition cases, they are not
helpful in resolving this issue. Section 1292(e),I07 on the other
ment, though argued by the plaintiff to be a denial of a permanent injunction, was not
appealable within § 1292(a)(1».
99. See 28 U.S.c. § 1292(a)(2)-(3) (1994).
100. See Martineau, supra note 54, at 732.
101. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(b) (1994).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages, Inc., 721 F.2d 625, 627 (7th Cir. 1983) (criti
cizing a district court that certified an order for appeal and strongly recommending that
future district courts adhere to the language of § 1292(b) when certifying); cf In re
Hamilton, 122 F.3d 13, 14 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that literal repetition of the statu
tory criteria in the district court's order of certification is not required, but also stating
that it would be a great help ... if the district court, whenever it certifies a case for an
immediate appeal under § 1292(b), explained why it thinks the case satisfies the statu
tory criteria) (citations omitted).
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)-(d) (1994).
106. See id.
107. See id. § 1292(e).

586

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:565

hand, adds an interesting provision that might aid in resolving the
controversy over which decisions are appealable.
Section 1292(e) states that "[t]he Supreme Court may pre
scribe rules, in accordance with section 2072108 of this title, to pro
vide for an appeal of an interlocutory decision to the courts of
appeals that is not otherwise provided for under subsection (a), (b),
(c), or (d)."109 Congress added § 1292(e) when it enacted the Fed
eral Courts Administration Act of 1992 and thereby gave the
Supreme Court the power to create new categories of interlocutory
appeals pursuant to its rule-making power. 110
The Supreme Court first received rule-making power to define
a "final decision" within § 1291 when Congress amended the above
mentioned § 2072 of the Rules Enabling Act 111 and added subsec
tion (c) as part of the Federal Courts Study Implementation Act of
1990.112 The Rules Enabling Act grants the Supreme Court the
power to make rules pertaining to practice, procedure, and evi
dence in the district courts and courts of appeals, so long as such
rules do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."113
Subsection (c) of the Rules Enabling Act provides that "[s]uch rules
may define when a ruling of a district court is final for purposes of
appeal under section 1291 of this title."114 While the Supreme
Court has been given the power, through the enactment of
§§ 1292(e) and 2072 (c), to prescribe rules that could clarify the fi
nality requirement, the Supreme Court has not yet exercised this
power.1 15 Notwithstanding this new power, § 1292 provides but one
of a number of different ways to obtain interlocutory review in spite
of the final judgment rule.
b.

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

In a multiple party or claim lawsuit, Rule 54(b) furnishes an
avenue to appellate review even though the trial phase is not yet
108. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text for the language of § 2072 of
the Rules Enabling Act.
109. 28 U.S.c. § 1292(e) (1994).
110. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101,
106 Stat. 4506.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994).
112. Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5104, 5115 (1990).
113. 28 U.S.c. § 2072(a)-(b) (1994).
114. Id. § 2072(c).
115. See Nagel, supra note 68, at 213-14 ("To date, however, the rulemakers have
yet to exercise their powers under either section 1292(e) or section 2072(c).").
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complete. 116 Rule 54(b) permits the federal' court to certify one ad
judicated claim or the adjudicated rights of one party as a final deci
sion even if the adjudication of the rest of the merits of the case is
ongoing. 117 Rule 54(b) enables a judge to enter a final judgment
for individual claims in cases with multiple claims or parties.1 18
However, the district court must first determine whether no just
cause exists to delay the entry of a final judgment, which is done on
a case-by-case basis. 119 The decision to certify is solely within the
discretion of the district court judge.12° Consequently, Rule 54(b)
makes it possible for a litigant to appeal immediately if the issues
concerning him or her are determined early.l2l In doing so, this
rule gives certainty to the appellant that his or her claim is final and
may be appealed. 122 An order becomes "final" for the purposes of
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
117. Rule 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action ... or when
multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judg
ment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an
express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an ex
press direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determi
nation and direction, any order ... however designated, which adjudicates
fewer than all the claims ... of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order ... is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims

Id.
118. See id. Multiple claims exist where each claim is factually independent or
where each claim could be enforced separately. See Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 582-83 (1980); Rieser v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 224 F.2d
198, 199 (2d Cir. 1955).
119. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 435 (1956).
120. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1,8 (1980) ("Not all
final judgments on individual claims should be immediately appealable, even if they are
in some sense separable from the remaining unresolved claims. The function of the
district court under the Rule is to act as a 'dispatcher."') (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
351 U.S. at 435).
121. See FDIC v. Tripati, 769 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1985). The effect of certification
is that the statute of limitations regarding appeal on the judgment begins to run. See id.
at 508.
122. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 512 (1950). In
Dickinson, the Supreme Court stated that:
The obvious purpose of [Rule 54(b)] ... is to reduce as far as possible the
uncertainty and the hazard assumed by a litigant who either does or does not
appeal from a judgment of the character we have here. It provides an oppor
tunity for litigants to obtain from the District Court a clear statement of what
that court is intending with reference to finality, and if such direction is de
nied, the litigant can at least protect himself accordingly.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also 10 CHAru.Es ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRAC
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 2654, at 37 (1998) ("The requirement in Rule 54(b) that the
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§ 1291 when judgment is entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) and is im

mediately appealable even though it is not the final judgment re
garding all of the claims or parties. l23
Nevertheless, Rule 54(b) certifications are not freely given. 124
As a result, this avenue of review, while appearing promising, is not
often travelled. Another avenue of review that circumvents the fi
nality requirement is the collateral order doctrine.
c.

The Collateral Order Doctrine

The collateral order doctrine, which the United States
Supreme Court first announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
Loan Corp.,12s provides for interlocutory appeals of collateral or
ders.126 In Cohen, the United States Supreme Court held that
where the order is within the "small class [of decisions] which fi
nally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause [of action] itself to require that appel
court make an express determination that there is no just reason for delaying the review
of a judgment on fewer than all of the claims or involving fewer than all of the parties in
an action eliminated any doubt whether an immediate appeal may be sought.").
123. See FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b).
124. See Spiegel v. Trustees of Tufts College, 843 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Yet
Rule 54(b) notwithstanding, there is a long-settled and prudential policy against the
scattershot disposition of litigation."); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 962,
965 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Judgments under Rule 54(b) must be reserved for the unusual case
in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of over
crowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an
early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.").
125. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court permitted the appeal of
an order requiring the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative suit to post security for the
reasonable expenses of the defendant if the plaintiff was unsuccessful in the suit. See id.
at 546-47.
126. See id. at 546. While there is some debate over whether the collateral order
doctrine is an exception to § 1291 or merely an interpretation of § 1291, most courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, believe that the collateral order doctrine is
an exception. See id. at 545-46; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S.
424, 430 (1985) (stating that the collateral order doctrine is a "narrow exception");
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 11 (1983) (charac
terizing the collateral order doctrine as an exception). But see Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662
F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1981) (characterizing an order as final because it gave relief which
was collateral to the merits and was not subject to review after trial); United States v.
Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 1972) (classifying the collateral order doctrine as
an exception, but also stating that the Supreme Court, in Cohen, was merely interpret
ing the meaning of final judgment). See generally Redish, supra note 76, at 111 n.120
(acknowledging that the collateral order doctrine has been described as both an inter
pretation and an exception to § 1291 and finding that the better view is to regard it as
an exception since its purpose is to permit review of interlocutory orders which are not
final).
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late consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated,"
an interlocutory appeal may be had. 127 After the ruling in Cohen,
courts and litigants frequently used the collateral order doctrine to
avoid the final judgment rule. 128
Responding to the overuse of the collateral order doctrine, the
Supreme Court, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,129 restated the
test. Under the new test, in order to be reviewed under the collat
eral order doctrine "an order must [1] conclusively determine the
disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely sepa
rate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreview
able on appeal from a final judgment."130 The Supreme Court
qualified the collateral order doctrine a second time when it stated
that only when "rights ... will be irretrievably lost in the absence of
an immediate appeal" will an order qualify for immediate review
under the collateral order doctrine. 131 The reformulation effected
in Coopers & Lybrand narrowed the scope of the collateral order
doctrine.13 2 As a result, the federal courts have not allowed imme
diate appeals under the collateral order doctrine from pretrial deni
127. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
128. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,169-72 (1974); see also Marti
neau, supra note 54, at 740 (stating that "[t]here were few orders that a determined
court of appeals could not qualify under the Cohen opinion"); Theodore D. Frank,
Requiem for the Final Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REv. 292 (1966) (discussing the wide
spread use of the collateral order rule to avoid final judgment requirements).
129. 437 U.S. 463 (1978). In Coopers & Lybrand, the Supreme Court rejected the
Second Circuit's determination that a denial of a motion to certify a class was review
able as a collateral order. See id. at 465.
130. Id. at 468.
131. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985); see also
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27 (1985) (holding that an order involving quali
fied immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982) (holding that an order involving absolute immunity
is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); Devine v. Indian River
County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court of appeals
has jurisdiction over an order denying pro se status under the collateral order doctrine);
O'Reilly v. New York Tl1Iles, Co., 692 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that an
order denying a motion to proceed pro se was appealable).
132. In each of the following cases, the order was held unreviewable under the
collateral order doctrine. These cases evidence the narrow scope of the collateral order
doctrine. See, e.g., Lauro Lines v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (denying motion to
dismiss because of a forum selection clause); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794, 799-800 (1989) (alleging violation of FED. R. <:RIM. P. 6(e»; Gulfstream
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988) (denying motion to stay or
dismiss because of a similar matter pending in state court); Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard,
486 U.S. 517 (1988) (denying motion to dismiss on the ground that a defendant is im
mune from civil process, and because of forum non conveniens); Richardson-Merrell
Inc., 472 U.S. at 424 (disqualifying counsel in civil case); Hanagan v. United States, 465
U.S. 259 (1984) (disqualifying or refusing to disqualify counsel in a criminal case).
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als of motions alleging speedy trial violations,133 prosecutorial
vindictiveness,134 or motions to suppress evidence.1 35
Nonetheless, the collateral order doctrine permits interlocu
tory review of orders that do not necessarily end the litigation on
the merits. For example, the Supreme Court has held that denials
of motions to dismiss an indictment based on the Double Jeopardy
Clause, as well as denials of pretrial motions to dismiss based on the
Speech and Debate Clause, are immediately appealable collateral
orders. 136 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that rulings on
133. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-61 (1978) (denying im
mediate appellate review of a denial of a motion to dismiss based on an alleged viola
tion of a constitutional right to a speedy trial because the issue was not collateral, the
determination was not final, and the right to appeal was not forever lost if review was
delayed); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying immediate
appellate review of an alleged violation of the Speedy Trial Act because the order was
reviewable at a later time); United States v. Tsosie, 966 F.2d 1357, 1359-62 (10th Cir.
1992) (same); United States v. Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1991) (same);
United States v. Holub, 944 F.2d 441, 442 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); ct. United States v.
Ford, 961 F.2d 150, 151 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that the district court
dismissal of an indictment without prejudice for violation of the speedy trial provision
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act was not immediately appealable because
the order was reviewable at a later date). But cf. United States v. Gates, 935 F.2d 187,
188 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing an immediate appeal from a denial of a motion for re
lease from pretrial detention pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act).
134. See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263, 270 (1982)
(per curiam) (denying the immediate appeal of a claim of prosecutorial vindictiveness
because the issue was reviewable after judgment); United States v. McKinley, 38 F.3d
428, 431 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider issue of prosecutorial vindictiveness on
interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction). But cf. United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965
F.2d 848, 853-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing the immediate appeal of a denial of a claim
of bad-faith prosecution because the right not to be tried is lost once tried).
135. See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121,131 (1962) (denying the immedi
ate review of orders granting or denying the suppression of evidence which was alleg
edly procured through an unlawful search and seizure); Carroll v. United States, 354
U.S. 394, 404-05 (1957) (holding that an order granting a motion to suppress was not
immediately appealable even if the result would be forced dismissal of the indictment
for lack of evidence); United States v. Carney, 665 F.2d 1064, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (holding that a denial of a motion to suppress evidence that was purportedly
covered by the Speech and Debate Clause was not immediately appealable because the
decision was not final); cf. United States v. Miller, 14 F.3d 761, 765 (2d Cir. 1994) (deny
ing the immediate appeal of an order, which denied a temporary restraining order that
would have prohibited the release of intercepted conversations, because order was re
viewable on final judgment and was adjudicated in appellant's own trials). But see In re
Search Warrant (sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 70 (3d Cir. 1987) (allowing an immediate appeal
of an order denying a motion to suppress medical records because the privacy rights of
the patients were sufficiently independent from the criminal proceeding against the
physician).
136. See Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995) (allowing the immediate
appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds even where the
accused had not yet been convicted a second time); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500,
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motions to reduce excessive bail are also immediately appealable
collateral orders.137
The All Writs Act 138
Writs of mandamus 139 also operate to provide review of non
final decisions despite the final judgment rule. The statutory basis
for writs of mandamus is the All Writs Act, which provides that
"[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by [an] Act of Con
gress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of the law."140
Higher courts use writs of mandamus to review cases of clear
abuse of discretion by lower courts,141 and to review cases where a
judge has attempted to exercise a power he or she does not pos
d.

508 (1979) (stating that Speech and Debate Clause protects members of Congress from
standing trial, which would be lost if immediate review was unavailable); Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659-63 (1977) (alIowing an immediate appeal of a denial of
a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds because the right to not be tried twice
is forever lost if tried).
137. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (allowing immediate appeal of a
denial of a motion to reduce bail because relief must be speedy to be effective); United
States v. Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (alIowing immediate appeal
of an order imposing a bail condition requiring the forfeiture of a $1 million bail bond if
the defendant committed a crime while on release, because the order was colIateral to
the issue of guilt in the instant case and involved a risk of unreviewable damage to a
constitutional right); United States v. Loya, 23 F.3d 1529, 1530 (9th Cir. 1994) (alIowing
immediate appeal of an order denying bail pending a hearing on revocation of super
vised release); United States v. Smith, 835 F.2d 1048, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1987) (alIowing
immediate appeal of an order denying bail pending disposition of a habeas corpus peti
tion because the order was separate from the merits, conclusively determined the ques
tion, and was effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment); United States v.
Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808, 812-13 (8th Cir. 1986) (alIowing immediate appeal of an order
denying a motion to reduce bail after pretrial release because the order was final, colIat
eral to the issue of guilt, and involved risk of irreparable damage to a constitutional
right); cf. United States v. Gundersen, 978 F.2d 580, 582-83 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing
immediate appeal).
138. 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (1994).
139. Mandamus is a Latin word meaning "[w]e command." BLACK'S LAW DIC
TIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990). The writ of mandamus originated in English common law
where it was generalIy used by the King to require an inferior court to do a particular
thing. See Crick, supra note 55, at 544-55.
140. 28 U.S.c. § 1651 (1994).
141. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964) (observing that a
writ of mandamus may be issued appropriately to review an expropriation of judicial
power or an abuse of discretion); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d Cir. 1965)
(stating that "modem use [of writ of mandamus] has been extended to include cases of
clear abuse of discretion"); In re Watkins, 271 F.2d 771, 772 (5th Cir. 1959) (explaining
that writs of mandamus should only be used in extreme cases where there is clear abuse
of discretion or expropriation of judicial power).
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sess. 142 For example, the courts of appeals use the writ of manda
mus as a method of supervising the district courts. 143 Many cases
have held that the writ of mandamus should only be used "to con
fine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdic
tion or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
SO."144

Although the writ of mandamus can operate as an exception to
the finality requirement of § 1291, the scope of its use is very nar
row. In fact, writs of mandamus are to be used only in extraordi
nary circumstances, such as when there is an obvious error or a
novel issue of law. 145 Despite the limited scope of its use, the writ
142.

See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Krentzman, 397 F.2d 55, 59 (5th Cir.

1968).
143. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (affirming Seventh
Circuit's decision to grant a writ of mandamus where the case had been referred to a
master despite the objections of every party). The Court stated, "[w]e believe that su
pervisory control of the District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper
judicial administration in the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts
of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the exceptional cir
cumstances existing here." Id. at 259-60.
144. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); see also Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daifion, Inc. 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (quoting Roche, 319 U.S. at 26); Will
v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661 (1978) (same); Kerr v. United States Dist.
Court, 426 U.S. 394,402 (1976) (same); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967)
(same); Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245 (1964) (same); Bank
ers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953) (same); United States Alkali
Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196,202 (1945) (same); Ex parte Republic of
Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 583 (1943) ("The writs thus afford an expeditious and effective
means of confining the inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction,
or of compelling it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.").
145. See Will, 389 U.S. at 95 ("[O]nly exceptional circumstances ... will justify the
invocation of this extraordinary remedy."); Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 110 (stating that
the "writ is appropriately issued ... when there is a 'usurpation of judicial power' or a
clear abuse of discretion") (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 346 U.S. at 383); Ex parte
Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (stating that extraordinary writs are "reserved for really
extraordinary causes"); In re Attorney Gen. of United States, 596 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.
1979) (stating that only exceptional cases warrant the exercise of supervisory control
through the use of a writ of mandamus); National Farmers' Org., Inc. v. Oliver, 530 F.2d
815, 816 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that the power of courts of appeals to issue writs of
mandamus should only be used in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances); Dow
Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 519 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1975) (same); General Motors Corp. v.
Lord, 488 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the use of a writ of mandamus
is only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, which may be present when a dis
trict court's order is made without jurisdiction, or where the order under attack is char
acteristic of an erroneous practice which is likely to recur, or where an order under
attack exemplifies a novel and important question in need of guidelines that will aid the
future resolution of similar cases); cf. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civic Ctr. Thea
tre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 360 (10th Cir. 1964) (stating that exercise of the power granted in
28 U.S.c. § 1651 is discretionary).
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of mandamus nevertheless provides review of orders that could not
be reviewed within the ambit of the finality requirement of § 1291.
Having traversed a great deal of background material, this
Note will now tum its attention to the case that brought the issue
discussed herein to light.
II.

A.

UNITED STATES V.

K IRByl46

Factual Setting

In 1983, after escaping from the Maze Prison in Belfast, North
ern Ireland, Terence Kirby,147 Pol Brennan,148 and Kevin Artt 149
arrived in the United States. 150 After extradition was requested by
the United Kingdom, United States' authorities arrested the poten
tial extraditees and held them in custody to await an extradition
hearing. 151 The potential extraditees moved for bail, and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
set bail for each.1 52 All three were released, and the United States,
on behalf of the United Kingdom, appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seeking review of the district
court's grant of bail.153 Before reviewing the grant of bail, the
Ninth Circuit specifically addressed whether it had jurisdiction to
review a bail decision by a district court judge in an extradition
matter. 154
146. 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1997).
147. Terence Kirby was convicted of various violent offenses in Northern Ireland
including felony murder, use of explosives, and possession of a firearm and explosives
with intent to cause injury. See In re Requested Extradition of Artt, 972 F. Supp. 1253,
1263 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
148. Pol Brennan was convicted in Northern Ireland of possession or control of a
bomb with the intent to endanger life or cause serious injury to property. See id. at
1261.
149. Kevin Artt was convicted of murder in Northern Ireland. See id. at 1265.
150. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 857.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 858. On January 3, 1996, Pol Brennan was released and committed
to the custody of his wife and employer on $500,000 bond, secured by $500,000 in prop
erty pledged by sureties. See id. Terence Kirby was released on the same date and
committed to the custody of three people, other than his wife with whom he resided, on
$1,000,000 bond secured by $500,000 in property and the signatures of five sureties. See
id. On January 10, 1996, Kevin Artt was released and committed to the custody of his
housemate and his employer on $500,000 bond secured by $100,000 in cash or property
and the signatures of five sureties. See id.
153. See id. at 857-58.
154. See id. at 858.
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The Majority Opinion
1.

Preliminary Discussion of Jurisdictional Issue

Judge Sneed, writing for the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, began the majority's analysis by quoting
. § 1291 which grants courts of appeals "jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courtS."155 Immediately thereafter
and without further explanation, the majority disagreed with the
extraditees's proposition that the court did not have jurisdiction to
hear this appeal because, according to the extraditees, bail rulings
in extradition matters were neither "final decisions" nor "decisions
of district courtS."156 Next, the majority explained that granting
bail in extradition matters is not favored and, in fact, bail is only
granted if "special circumstances" exist.1 57 The majority noted that
the disapproval of bail in extradition cases unless "special circum
stances" are present is in direct opposition to the presumption that
bail will be granted in domestic cases without any required showing
of special circumstances. 158 The majority then explained that, un
like habeas corpus cases where the government's right to appeal is
set forth by statute,159 there is no authority that explicitly grants
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and there is no Supreme Court rul
ing that speaks to this factual setting. 160
Before defining the bail decision in this case as a "final deci
sion of the district court," the majority set forth several reasons why
the argument made by the extraditees, that bail decisions in extradi
tion cases are not reviewable, could not properly stand. 161 First, the
majority found that denying the government the right to appeal in
this instance would result in asymmetry between the potential ex
traditee and the government because the potential extraditee could
always appeal through the use of habeas corpus while the govern
ment would have no further avenue to pursue. 162 Second, the ma
155. Id.; see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994). See supra Part 1.C.2 for a discussion of
the history of § 1291.
156. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858.
157. See id. (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903».
158. See id. (citing Beaulieu v. Hartigan, 554 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1977».
159. See id. Section 2255 of the Federal Courts Improvement Act provides the
right to appeal habeas corpus decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
The statute states, "[a]n appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order
entered on the motion as from the final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus." Id.
160. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 858.
161. See id. at 858-59.
162. See id. at 858.
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jority expressed concern that since the only time bail-can be granted
in extradition cases is when "special circumstances" are present, de
nying review of these determinations would "inadequately secure
the 'special circumstances' requirement."163 Third, the majority
found that if the "special circumstances" requirement was allowed
to be weakened through the denial of judicial review, then the abil
ity of the United States to comply with its treaties would be viewed
by other nations as compromised. l64
The majority asserted that the ability of the Unites States to
comply with its treaties was especially important in light of the fer
vent attention being paid to the unrest in Northern Ireland,165 such
that the courts must act "sensitively and scrupulously" in the role
appointed to them by the Supplementary Treaty.166 Nevertheless,
the majority recognized that the treaty did not guarantee jurisdic
tion to the court of appeals to review the grant of bail given by the
district court in this case.1 67 Rather, the majority found that § 1291
provided the basis for the court's jurisdiction over this matter. 168
2.

a.

Appellate Jurisdiction Under Section 1291

Grants of bail are decisions of the district court

The majority began by defining bail decisions as decisions of
the district court and rejected the extraditees' argument and the dis
sent's argument that the district court granted bail using authority
given by § 3184 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.169 The majority
reasoned that since § 3184 merely pertains to apprehending and
certifying the potential extraditee for extradition, and makes no
mention of granting bail, the district court could not possibly have
been using the power granted in § 3184 when it granted bail.170
163. Id. at 859. The majority did not elaborate; however, when a standard is not
reviewable it can be whittled away, because there is no means to ensure it remains
stringent.
164. See id.
165. See id. See generally James T. Kelly, Article, The Empire Strikes Back: The
Taking of Joe Doherty, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 317, 318-29 (1992) (discussing thoroughly
the problems occurring in Northern Ireland).
166. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859.
167. See id; see also Extradition Treaty, supra note 10.
168. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859-61; see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994).
169. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859; see also Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994
& Supp. II 1996). See infra note 170 for the relevant language of § 3184.
170. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. 111996)
which states:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the
United States and any foreign government . . . any justice or judge of the
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According to the majority, the authority of the district court to
set bail was established in Wright v. Henkel,171 where the United
States Supreme Court gave courts the power to grant bail. 172 The
Kirby majority reasoned that a judge's bail decision is a decision "of
the district court" because the power was given to "courts" as op
posed to judges or magistrates. 173 Thus, the majority concluded
that the bail decision made in this case was a decision made by the
district court as required by § 1291.174

b.

Bail rulings in extradition cases are final decisions under
section 1291
In determining that bail decisions in extradition cases are final

decisions, the majority reviewed § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of
1984175 which states, in relevant part, that appeals in criminal cases
are "governed by the provisions of § 1291 of title 28 and § 3731 of
[title 18]."176 The majority then, without mention of § 3731p7 ana
lyzed § 1291 which covers "final decisions" and § 1292 which, conUnited States, or any magistrate ... may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes pro
vided for by such treaty or convention ... issue his warrant for the apprehen
sion of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard
and considered.
. . . If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the
charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify
the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the
Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper
authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, ac
cording to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his
warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there
to remain until such surrender shall be made.

Id.
171. 190 U.S. 40 (1903).
172. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859 (citing Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903».
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994).
176. Id.; see also Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859.
177. Although it was not explicitly addressed in the opinion, § 3731 of the Omni
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act governs when appeals may be taken by the
United States in criminal cases. The dissent used the existence of § 3731 to argue that
bail decisions in extradition cases are different than in criminal cases because, unlike
extradition cases, there are explicit statutory provisions granting the right of appeal to
the United States in criminal cases. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867; see also Bail Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994).
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versely, covers "interlocutory decisions."178 The majority deduced
that bail decisions are not merely interlocutory because if they
were, § 1292, which governs interlocutory decisions, would have
been specified as governing domestic bail appeals in § 3145. In
stead, the majority found that § 1291, which controls final decisions,
was specified. 179 The majority then concluded that bail decisions in
general are final decisions. 18o
Next, the majority reasoned that the bail decision serves the
same purpose in either a domestic criminal case or an extradition
case. 181 The majority pointed out that in both cases bail decisions
determine whether a person will be held in custody or released
pending further proceedings in his case. 182 Due to this similarity,
the majority found that bail decisions in extradition cases are final
decisions just like bail decisions in criminal cases. 183
Further, the majority addressed the dissent's argument that the
absence of a statutory provision allowing direct appeals in extradi
tion cases distinguishes extradition cases from criminal cases pre
cisely because there is such a statute concerning appeals in criminal
cases. l84 The majority responded by noting that explicit statutory
grants of authority are not always necessary before a court may
act,185 The majority found the dissent's argument to be inconsistent
with the dissent's own reasoning in the case. 186 The majority
pointed out that the dissent contradicted itself when it first agreed
178. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860.
179. See id.; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994); 28 U.S.c. §§ 1291-92 (1994).
180. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id. After reaching this conclusion, the majority, in a footnote, countered
the dissent's argument that extradition cases differ from criminal cases because the gov
ernment can always begin new extradition proceedings and, in effect, appeal an adverse
bail ruling. See id. at 860 n.5. The majority found the dissent's reasoning unsatisfac
tory, stating that if the government was required to initiate new proceedings instead of
being allowed to directly appeal, then efficiency in the judicial process, which is of ut
most concern, would be lost. See id.
184. See id. at 860.
185. See id. The majority explained in a footnote that previously, when no ex
plicit statutory provision existed to provide for government appeals of bail rulings in
criminal cases, some courts found jurisdiction. See id. at 860 n.6. (citing Iuteri v.
Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1981». The majority further explained that Con
gress later passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to provide jurisdiction for government
appeals of bail rulings in criminal cases explicitly where Congress said it may have been
implicit in earlier statutes. See id. The majority appeared to suggest that jurisdiction
for this appeal is also implicit in earlier statutes, i.e. § 1291, even though it has not yet
been explicitly granted. See id. at 860.
186. See id.
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that district court judges could grant bail in extradition cases de
spite no explicit authority to do so, and then argued that there
could be no right to review the bail decision without explicit statu
tory authority.1 87 The majority conceded that some basis must be
found to provide jurisdiction before it could hear the case. 188 How
ever, the majority also asserted that courts would be severely lim
ited if explicit statutes were required in every instance. 189
After the preceding discussion, the majority reaffirmed its de
termination that, just as a decision to grant bail in a criminal case is
final under § 1291, a decision to grant bail in an extradition case is
also final.1 90 Next, the majority turned to other case law for sup
port of its holding.
c.

Other case law supports the finding of jurisdiction

The majority supported its holding by citing other cases in
which courts had reviewed bail decisions in extradition matters. 191
The majority cited these cases because in each case the appellate
court reviewed the district court's grant of bail, without ever ad
dressing whether they had jurisdiction to do SO.I92 Next, the major
ity distinguished cases where courts had ruled that they did not
have jurisdiction to review bail decisions in extradition cases. 193
The majority distinguished these cases by pointing out that in each
187. See id. In making this point, the majority stated, "Judge Noonan cannot
have it both ways." Id. The majority further reasoned that either the district court
judge had no authority to grant bail in the first place, or if he did have that power, then
it follows that an explicit grant of authority is not always necessary before a judge may
act. See id.
188. The majority found that § 1291 provided the basis for jurisdiction of this
appeal. See id.
189. See id. at 860-61. The majority explained that courts do not need statutes
telling them when to apply other statutes because courts have habitually applied stat
utes to specific situations without needing explicit authority to do so. See id. at 861.
The majority found "statutory interpretation would be impossible if judges were pre
cluded from applying statutes in this manner." Id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 861-62; see also United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir.
1996) (reversing district court's grant of bail); In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535
(9th Cir. 1992) (same); Hu Yau-Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (af
firming grant of bail by district court in habeas case following magistrate's issuance of
certificate of extraditability); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979)
(reversing district court's grant of bail).
192. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 861.
193. See id. at 861-62; see also In re Extradition of Ghandtchi, 697 F.2d 1037 (11th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the court did not have jurisdiction to review bail decision in
extradition case); In re Extradition of Krickemeyer, 518 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(same).
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case the court had held that a district court may not review a magis
trate's bail decision in an extradition case and did not rule on
whether a district court's bail decision could be reviewed by the
court of appeals.l 94 Furthermore, the majority discounted these
cases because they were not controlling authority over the Ninth
Circuit and because they arose under a different treaty than the one
at issue in Kirby.195
d.

Judicial responsibility under the treaty favors appellate review

As a final factor in its decision concerning the jurisdictional
issue, the majority stressed that judicial responsibility for enforcing
the treaties made by the United States was placed on the district
courts and courts of appeals by Article 3(b) of the Supplementary
Treaty because Article 3(b) explicitly named both sets of courtS.196
Considering that Article 3(b) provides for an "immediately avail
able" appeal after a determination concerning the "political of
fense" defense,197 the majority reasoned that the extraditees would
most likely come before the court of appeals at a later date. 198
194. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 861.
195. See id. The treaty involved in In re Extradition of Ghandtchi, 697 F.2d 1037
(11th Cir. 1983) and In re Extradition of Krickemeyer, 518 F. Supp. 388 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
was the extradition treaty between the United States and the Federal Republic of Ger
many, Extradition Treaty, June 20, 1978, U.S.-F.R.G., 32 U.S.T. 1485.
196. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 862. Article 3(b) of the Supplementary Treaty states:
In the United States, the competent judicial authority shall only consider the
defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for offenses listed in Article I
of this Supplementary Treaty. A finding under paragraph (a) shall be immedi
ately appealable by either party to the United States district coun, or coun of
appeals, as appropriate. The appeal shall receive expedited consideration at
every stage. The time for filing a notice of appeal shall be 30 days from the
date of the filing of the decision. In all other respects, the applicable provi
sions of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure or Civil Procedure, as ap
propriate, shall govern the appeals process.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
197. The "political offense" defense is embodied in Article 3(a) of the Supple
mentary Treaty which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the com
petent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request
for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on
account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinions, or that he would,
if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained, or restricted in
his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political
opinions.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 10. See supra note 34 for further discussion of the
"political offense" defense to extradition.
198. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 862.
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While stressing the role of the United States' courts in protecting
the interests and rights of all of the parties involved, the majority
concluded that these rights and interests would be best preserved
by review of both the grant of bail and its sufficiency immediately
after the bail decision was made, as opposed to after the completion
of the extradition hearing. 199 Based on the reasoning set forth
above, the majority found that it was the court's duty to review the
grants of bail and their sufficiency.2oo The majority then reviewed
the grants of bail and found that the grants of bail, as well as the
terms of each extraditee's bail release, were both proper and
sufficient. 201
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

Judge Noonan began the dissent by noting that federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, and as such, they must find their
199. See id. at 862-63.
See id. at 863.
See id. at 863-65. The majority considered four factors when reviewing the
grant of bail. The factors considered were the factors relied on by the district court to
show that special circumstances existed when granting bail. See id. at 863-64. The ma
jority found that the first factor, delay, was recognized by this and other circuits, and
because the appellees themselves were not responsible for the delay, it could not find
that the district court erred in relying on delay as a special circumstance. See id. at 863
(citing United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523, 524 (1st Cir. 1996); Salerno v. United
States, 878 F.2d 317 (9th Cir. 1989».
Next, the majority looked at the "parity with Smyth" factor. See id. at 863. Smyth,
a potential extraditee whose extremely similar case was determined before this case,
had been out on bail for over one year by the time the appellees' bail hearings were
held. See id. The district court, in releasing the appellees, stressed that they should be
treated consistent with Smyth. See id. Conversely, the United States, focusing on the
ultimate revocation of Smyth's bail upon review, argued on appeal that the appellees
should be kept in custody. See id. The majority found that while both arguments had
merit, the district court's reliance on "parity with Smyth" as a special circumstance was
understandable. See id.
Next, the court rejected the district court's third special circumstance, that the ap
pellees would not receive credit for time spent in custody in the United States upon
returning to the United Kingdom, because it is common in extradition cases for persons
extradited to not receive credit for time spent in custody in the United States upon
return to the requesting nation. See id.
Reviewing the fourth factor, the majority stated that the district court could not be
faulted for finding that the "cloud" cast on extradition proceedings by the Lobue case
was a special circumstance. See id. at 864. In Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65
(D.D.C. 1995), vacated, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the court held that 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) violated the separation of powers requirement because it
empowered an Executive Branch official, the Secretary of State, to review an Article III
judicial officer. See Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 78. Hence, at the time the district court
judge in Kirby heard the bail hearings, there was a "cloud" cast over all extradition
proceedings by the Lobue decision. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 864.
200.
201.
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authority to review a case in either a statute or the Constitution. 202
The dissent next stressed that the jurisdiction of the courts of ap
peals is determined by statute,203 and that courts may not expand
their given jurisdiction by judicial decision. 204 The dissent noted
that the United States had not cited any statute that would confer
jurisdiction on the United States Courts of Appeals to review bail
decisions in extradition matters. 205
Even though the dissent found that the absence of any explicit
statutory authority should be the end of the court's discussion, the
dissent continued to address arguments raised by the United States
and by the majority.206 In response to the majority's citation of case
law in which courts reviewed bail decisions, the dissent highlighted
the absence of any discussion within these decisions concerning ju
risdiction to review grants of bail in extradition cases. 207 The dis
sent found this to be critical because when a court does not discuss
an issue, the case has no precedential value on that issue. 208 The
dissent questioned the majority's· reliance on such
"nonprecedents."209
Next, the dissent addressed the argument made by the United
States that since the district court had no authority to grant bail in
this case, the district court must have been granting a writ of habeas
cOrpUS. 210 Stating that habeas corpus and bail are two entirely dif
ferent things, the dissent rejected this argument. 211 The dissent
202. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994». For a discussion of the juris
dictional requirement in general, see supra Part I.C.1.
203. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Vylene
Enter., Inc., 968 F.2d 887, 889 (9th Cir. 1992». Section 1291 determines the jurisdiction
of the courts of appeals. See Act of June 25, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
204. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Kokkonen, 511
U.S. at 377).
205. See ill. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 865-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
207. See ill. at 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Extradition of Smyth, 976
F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1992».
208. See ill. at 865-66 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Vroman,
975 F.2d 669, 672 (9th Cir. 1992».
209. See ill. at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
210. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). If this argument had been accepted, the
government would have been entitled to an appeal pursuant to § 2255 of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act. See 28 U.S.c. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Section 2255
states, in relevant part, "An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order
entered on the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas
corpus." Id.
211. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting). Emphasizing the differ
ences between a grant of bail and a grant of a writ of habeas corpus, the dissent noted
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briefly recognized that a writ of mandamus would not be appropri
ate. 212 The dissent noted that both parties had briefed the issue,
and the United States had conceded that three of the five factors
necessary to obtain mandamus were absent. 213
Finally, the dissent turned to the majority's argument that bail
decisions by district court judges in extradition matters are review
able because they are in fact "final decisions." First, the dissent
found that the decision to grant bail was not made by the district
court. 214 The dissent reasoned that an extradition judge does not
exercise judicial power; rather, he or she is an auxiliary to the exec
utive branch. 2Is According to the dissent, an extradition judge's de
cision can not be a final decision of the district court because he or
that bail is normally governed by statute whereas habeas corpus is a constitutional rem
edy. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Bail Reform Act of 1984,18 U.S.c. §§ 3146,
3148,3156 (1994». The dissent further reasoned that habeas corpus challenges the le
gality of the confinement by the state whereas bail does not; instead, when one asks for
bail, he is merely stating that confinement is not necessary to guarantee his presence at
further proceedings in his case. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Walters v.
Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995». Further, the dissent remarked that in order
for review on habeas corpus to be granted, all other avenues of review must be ex
hausted. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16
(1982». The dissent pointed out that this is in contrast to an application for bail, which
can be determined immediately, by petitioning the judge in charge of the prisoner. See
id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). Lastly, the dissent observed that the standard of review is
de novo in a habeas case whereas the standard of review is deferential when reviewing a
bail decision. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446,
1451 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Townsend, 897 F.2d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 1990». De
novo review results in "[t]rying the matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard
before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY 435 (6th ed. 1990). Conversely, deferential review results in the court upholding
the lower court's decision unless it is obviously in error. In this sense, the appellate
court "defers" to the judgment of the lower court. Ultimately, the dissent concluded
that the extraditees applied for and were granted bail; hence, they could not have been
granted writs of habeas corpus. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
212. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
213. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting). The five factors which must be present to
obtain mandamus, as stated in Bauman v. United States District Court, 557 F.2d 650,
654-55 (9th Cir. 1977), are:
(1) The party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct
appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires .... (2) The petitioner will be
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal (3) The district
court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law (4) The district court's
order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the fed
eral rules (5) The district court's order raises new and important problems, or
issues of law of first impression.
(citations omitted).
214. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
215. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103,
119 (1852); In re Extradition of Howard, 996 F.2d 1320, 1325 (1st Cir. 1993».
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she is acting as an auxiliary, not as the court. 216
Second, the dissent found that the district court's order was not
final because the government is not barred by res judicata217 in ex
tradition matters. 218 The dissent explained that if the extradition
decision itself is not final, then the bail decision within it cannot be
final.2 19 The dissent noted that releases on bail do not conclusively
determine a disputed question. 220 Accordingly, the dissent asserted
that noncompliance with a technical rule of procedure was suffi
cient to deny this court jurisdiction.221 Consequently, the dissent
disputed the majority's reasoning and found that the decision could
not be a "final decision" as called for by § 1291.222
Third, the dissent explained that since the Federal Rules of
Procedure pertain to either criminal or civil cases, the Federal
Rules contain no provisions regarding the review of bail decisions
in extradition matters. 223 The dissent stressed that an explicit stat
ute was necessary to provide appellate review of bail orders beyond
any alleged jurisdictional power provided for in § 1291.224 Based
on this observation, the dissent reasoned that the absence of an ex
plicit statute in this situation highlighted the lack of jurisdiction.225
The dissent concluded its reasoning by questioning the major
ity's use of § 1291 as a basis for jurisdiction in this case. 226 The
dissent challenged the majority's reliance on § 1291 because that
reliance created the impression that § 3731, which was created to
provide jurisdiction over appeals in domestic criminal bail cases, is
216. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see also Act of June 25,
1948, 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994).
217. Res judicata refers to the "[r]ule that a final judgment rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and
their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involv
ing the same claim, demand, or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th
ed.1990).
218. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Hooker v. Klein,
573 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1978».
219. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Confederated Salish v.
Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994».
221. See id. at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Lopez v. City of Needles, 95
F.3d 20 (9th Cir. 1996); Proud v. United States, 704 F.2d 1099, 1100 (9th Cir. 1983».
222. See id. at 866-67 (Noonan, J., dissenting); see also 28 U.S.c. § 1291 (1994).
223. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing Merino v. United
States Marshall, 326 F.2d 5, 12-13 (9th Cir. 1963».
224. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.c. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994».
225. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
226. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
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redundant. 227 The dissent suggested that if bail decisions fit as
neatly within § 1291 as the majority found, then the enactment of
§ 3731 would have been unnecessary because the right to appeal
domestic grants of bail would have already been provided for by
§ 1291.228 The dissent commented that it was a poor choice for the
majority to interpret an existing statute such that it renders a later
act of Congress unnecessary. 229
Lastly, the dissent discussed policy choices that should shape
the court's actions.23o The dissent recognized that reaching a deci
sion that would give the court jurisdiction was enticing. 231 How
ever, the dissent emphasized that the court should not act beyond
that which has been mandated by Congre8s. 232 The dissent re
marked that the court's decision should be enough to alert Con
gress to the potential void in the statutes that provide jurisdiction to
the courts of appeals, and that it is Congress's duty, not the courts',
to fill that void if Congress deems it necessary.233 The dissent as
serted that judicial activism that goes so far that a judge will create
jurisdiction where none exists, simply because it is desirable, is in
direct opposition to our government of laws, which requires that
-courts only act where a l,aw has given them the authority to do 80. 234
Now that familiarity with the salient information has been
gained, the next section of this Note analyzes the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Kirby.

III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

International extradition entails a process that is controlled by
treaty and federal statutes. 235 These sources of law provide a
mechanism whereby a country who is a party to the treaty can re
quest the surrender of a person who is found within the territory of
the United States.
During the extradition process, the "extraditee" awaits a hear
ing that determines whether he or she will be extradited. Some
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
depth.

See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See id. (Noonan, J.,
See supra Part I.A

dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
dissenting).
for a discussion of the extradition process in greater

1999]

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION GRANTS OF BAIL

605

times, while awaiting this hearing, the extraditee moves for bail. If
the presiding judicial body grants bail, the United States can at
tempt to have the grant of bail revoked, thereby placing the poten
tial extraditee back in its custody, by reinstituting the extradition
process with a second judicial body or by obtaining appellate review
of the bail decision. 236
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Kirby,237 was the first
court to address the jurisdictional issue of whether the United
States Courts of Appeals may review a grant of bail by a United
States Distrtct Court judge in an extradition mater. 238 The primary
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in
Kirby centered around whether a grant of bail in an international
extradition matter is a final decision of the district court, which may
be reviewed by the court of appeals. 239
The Kirby majority found that appellate jurisdiction existed for
the court of appeals to review the district court's grant of bail be
cause 28 U.S.c. § 1291 provides that "[t]he courts of appeals ...
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the dis
trict court."240 The majority supported its holding with several rea
sons. First, the majority found that bail could only be granted in
extradition cases by "courtS."241 Consequently, the majority rea
soned that the bail decision in Kirby was a decision of a district
court.242 Second, the majority concluded that the grant of bail
given in this case was a final decision because it is similar to a bail
decision in a domestic criminal case which, according to the major
ity's analysis, is a final decision. 243 The majority held that, because
the decision was a final decision of the district court, the decision
was reviewable within the jurisdiction provided to the courts of ap
236. See supra Part I.A.2 for a discussion of the granting of bail within the extra
dition process.
237. 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1997).
238. Other courts have reviewed bail decisions in extradition cases; however,
Kirby was the first to explain that § 1291 provides the basis of jurisdiction to hear the
appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Kin-Hong, 83 F.3d 523 (1st Cir. 1996) (reversing
district court's grant of bail); In re Extradition of Smyth, 976 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); cf. Hu Yau
Leung v. Soscia, 649 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming grant of bail by district
court in habeas case following magistrate's issuance of certificate of extraditability).
239. See supra Parts II.B and II.C, respectively, for a detailed discussion of the
majority and dissenting opinions in Kirby.
240. Kirby, 106 F.3d at 859 (quoting 28 u.s.c. § 1291 (1994».
241. See id. (quoting Wrightv. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903».
242. See id.
243. See id. at 860.
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peals by § 1291. 244
Conversely, the dissent concluded that appellate jurisdiction is
not available to the courts of appeals for review of a grant of bail
given by a district court judge. 245 The dissent also supported its
finding with several reasons. The dissent found that where there is
no explicit statutory grant of power, courts are powerless to act. 246
Next, the dissent, stating that the power to hear extradition cases is
not a judicial power, found that grants of bail in international extra
dition matters are not decisions of the court.247 The dissent also
disagreed with the majority's classification of the bail decision as a
final decision. 248 The dissent concluded its reasoning by asserting
that the right to confer this jurisdiction lies with Congress and not
the courtS.249 Recognizing that the opinions rendered in Kirby
make justifiable points, this Note, nevertheless, argues that a
sounder decision could have been reached in Kirby. This analysis
begins by highlighting the questionable bases of the majority's
reasomng.
A.

Bail Decisions in International Extradition Cases Are Not
Final Decisions

In determining that bail decisions in extradition matters are fi
nal, the majority relied on § 3145 of the Bail Reform Act of 1984. 250
As described earlier, § 3145 controls appeals from grants of bail in
domestic criminal cases by magistrates or other persons who are not
judges of the court of original jurisdiction over the matter. 251 The
majority stressed the language of § 3731, which states that such ap
peals are "governed by section 1291 and by section 3731" of Title
28. 252 The majority focused on the words of § 3145, stating that ap
peals from bail decisions in criminal cases are governed by § 1291,
which governs appellate review of final decisions. 253 The majority
244. See id.
245. See id. a~ 865 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
246. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 866 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
248. See id. (Noonan, J., dissenting).
249. See id. at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
250. See id. at 860; see also 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). For a discussion of the rele
vant portion of the Kirby decision, see supra Part n.B.2.b.
251. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994). For the sake of clarity, assume that any future ref
erence to grants of bailor bail decisions made by magistrates includes within it a refer
ence to grants of bailor bail decisions made by any other persons who are not judges of
the court of original jurisdiction over the matter.
252. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994».
253. See id.
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then concluded "[t]hus by reason of 18 U.S.c. § 3145, bail decisions
in criminal cases are 'final' within the meaning of section 1291."254
In reaching this conclusion, the majority implied that § 1292, which
governs interlocutory appeals, would have been specified in § 3145
as governing appeals from grants of bail in domestic cases if bail
decisions, in general, were merely interlocutory.255
Comparing bail decisions in extradition cases with bail deci
sions in domestic criminal cases and finding little difference, the
majority concluded that bail decisions, irrespective of the context in
which they are made, are final decisions. 256 Confidently, the major
ity stated, "To rebut this presumption, there must be a principled
basis for holding that bail decisions in extradition cases are some
how 'less final' than bail decisions in criminal cases."257 Yet, the
majority's argument rests on the assumption that grants of bail in
criminal cases, which are similar to extradition cases, are final deci
. sions. This assumption is questionable.
In order to find that criminal bail decisions were final, the ma
jority mistakenly relied on § 3145 as the parallel jurisdictional pro
vision supporting appeals from grants of bail in domestic criminal
cases. However, § 3145 actually governs bail decisions made by
magistrates. 258 Section 3731, on the other hand, governs appeals of
grants of bail by district court judges and provides the true analyti
cal parallel.259 A district court judge made the bail decision in
Kirby, not a magistrate. 260 The Kirby majority's mistaken reliance
on § 3145 is significant because § 3731, unlike § 3145, does not con
tain any language recognizing § 1291 261 as a governing rule. Thus, if
the Kirby majority had relied on the true statutory parallel in this
case to make its argument, it would have been left without a basis
for its argument. The language of § 3145, which states that § 1291,
in conjunction with § 3731, controls grants of bail, relates to appeals
from decisions by magistrates, not decisions by district court
judges. 262
Assuming that the above distinction is not dispositive, an addi
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Id.
258. 18 U.S.c. § 3145 (1994); see also supra note 50 for the text of § 3145.
259. 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994); see also supra note 48 for the text of § 3731.
260. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 857.
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
262. See 18 U.S.C. § 3145 (1994); see also 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994), which ad
dresses appeals of decisions by district court judges.
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tiona! flaw in the majority's reasoning occurs at this point of the
Kirby opinion. The majority ignored the language of § 3145 which
states that § 3731 also governs bail decisions. 263 Section 3731 pro
vides that appeal by the United States of an adverse bail decision by
a district court lies with a court of appeals. 264 As noted by the dis
sent, if bail decisions in criminal cases were final, then this portion
of § 3731 would have been unnecessary because the United States
would have already been able to appeal the decision as a final deci
sion. 265 Further, the legislative history of § 3145 contradicts the ma
jority's position that the reference to § 1291 in § 3145 equates bail
decisions with finality.266
After the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 3731
explicitly grants the government the right to appeal an adverse bail
decision. 267 It follows that § 1291 alone was not sufficient to grant
jurisdiction to the courts of appeals over appeals by the government
from adverse domestic bail rulings. The legislative history of § 3145
discloses the reasoning behind the legislature's choice to specify
both § 1291 and § 3145 as governing bail decisions in criminal cases.
In analyzing § 3145, the Senate noted that "[a]ppeals under
this section are to be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in the case of an
appeal by the defendant and by 18 U.S.c. § 3731 in the case of an
appeal by the government."268 Hence, the legislative history of
§ 3145 contradicts the majority's position that bail decisions are al
ways final decisions. While bail decisions may be considered final
under the majority's reasoning when adverse to the defendant, bail
decisions adverse to the government are not. 269 In fact, the legisla
tive history explicitly shows that the legislature did not intend its
reference to § 1291 to signify that grants of bail are final.2 70
Section 1291 by itself does not confer jurisdiction to review bail
decisions in domestic criminal cases when the government is the
appellant. Similarly, § 1291 can not by itself provide jurisdiction for
review of bail decisions in international extradition cases when the
government is the appellant. In addition to the questionable as
263. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860.
264. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1994).
265. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 867 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
266. See SENATE COMMITTEE ON TIiE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 98-225, at 29-30
(1983), reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3212-13.
267. 18 U.S.c. § 3731 (1994).
268. SENATE COMMITTEE ON lHE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 29 (1983),
reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3212 (emphasis added).
269. See id.
270. See id.

1999]

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION GRANTS OF BAIL

609

sumptions described above, the majority's argument that courts
may act without explicit authority is also dubious.
B.

The Majority's Argument that Courts May Act Without
Explicit Authority is Not Supported

Countering the dissent's suggestion that without explicit statu
tory authority there can be no review, the majority pointed to the
Second Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction in Iuteri v. Nardoza. 271 In
Iuteri, the Second Circuit reviewed a grant of bail given by a district
court judge pending a decision on luteri's petition for a writ of
habeas cOrpUS. 272 Since Iuteri was decided prior to the enactment
of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, there was, at that time, no explicit
statutory authority which authorized review of a grant of bail in a
domestic criminal case. 273 Once enacted, §§ 3145 and 3731 of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, respectively, explicitly provided that
grants of bail by magistrates and district court judges can be imme
diately appealed. 274
The majority stated that by enacting §§ 3145 and 3731, Con
gress was making explicit the appellate jurisdiction which was im
plicit before. 275 However, a close examination of § 3145's
legislative history reveals that the legislature did not necessarily ac
cept that it was providing jurisdiction where it had been implicit
previously.276 In regard to the amendments made to § 3145, the
Senate stated that:
Section 3145, in conjunction with the amendment to 18 U.S.c.
3731, would specifically authorize the government, as well as the
defendant, to seek review and appeal of release decisions. The
Bail Reform Act [of 1996] makes no provisions for review of de
cisions upon motion of the government, although this authority
may be implicit in the Act. 277

After appearing to recognize that this authority may have been
implicit, the Senate added a footnote citing to United States v. Zuc
caro ,278 a case holding that the right of the government to seek re
271. 662 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 & n.6.
272. See Iuteri, 662 F.2d at 161.
273. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6.
274. 18 V.S.c. §§ 3145, 3731 (1994).
275. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6.
276. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 29-30
(1983), reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. at 3212-13.
277. Id. at 30, reprinted in 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 3213.
278. 645 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1981).
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consideration of a bail determination by the trial court is implicit in
the Bail Reform Act [of 1966).279 Next, the Senate stated, "[s]ince
18 U.S.C. 3147(b) [of the Bail Reform Act of 1966] permits appeal
of release decisions only when the defendant has been detained, it is
doubtful that the government has any right to appeal, as opposed to
a right to seek reconsideration under the Act."28o As the legislature
noted, before the enactment of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, appeal
of release decisions was not permitted when the defendant had
been granted bail.281 The legislature thus concluded that the right
of the government to appeal was "doubtful," despite the fact that
the Zuccaro court may have found it was implicit.282
The majority, at this juncture, was attempting to establish that
if jurisdiction was implicit to review grants of bail in domestic crimi
nal cases before enactment of explicit statutory authority, then ju
risdiction is implicit in this case to review grants of bail in
international extradition cases without explicit statutory author
ity.283 However, simply because Congress eventually sanctioned
the exercise of jurisdiction by courts like Zuccaro, which in fact
lacked explicit jurisdiction, the eventual sanction does not signify
that Congress has delegated its power to determine jurisdiction to
the courts.
Having addressed several difficulties with the Kirby majority's
analysis, this Note will now turn its attention to providing a simpler
solution to this issue. The Kirby court did not need to force grants
of bail given by district court judges into the category of "final deci
sions" in order to obtain jurisdiction over the matter. Rather, the
Kirby court could have relied on the collateral order doctrine to
tailor a solution to the problem.
C.

The Kirby Court Did Not Address the Collateral Order
Doctrine

An alternative avenue for conferring jurisdiction on the United
States Courts of Appeals to review bail decisions by district court
judges in international extradition cases, which was not addressed
by either the majority or the dissent in Kirby, is the collateral order
279. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 30 0.93
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3213 0.93.
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. See 18 U.S.c. § 3147(b) (repealed 1984).
282. See SENATE COMMfITEE ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REp. No. 98-225, at 300.93
(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3213 0.93.
283. See Uoited States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 860 (9th Cir. 1997).
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doctrine. The collateral order doctrine operates to allow review of
decisions that are collateral to the merits and which conclusively
determine an important issue.
In order to fall within the collateral order doctrine, the deci
sion "must: [1] conclusively determine the disputed question [2] re
solve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
case, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."284 Grants of bail in international extradition matters
fall squarely within these requirements.
Grants of bail in international extradition matters meet the
first requirement of the collateral order doctrine because they con
clusively determine the question of whether potential extraditees
will be released on bail.285 After the bail decision is made, either
bail is granted or bail is refused. When bail is denied, the potential
extraditee may receive review of sorts by petitioning for a writ of
habeas cOrpUS. 286 However, when bail is granted by the district
court, the decision will not be reviewed prior to trial.287 In addi
tion, bail decisions in extradition cases meet the second require
ment of the collateral order doctrine because they are separate
from the merits of an extradition case. 288 The merits·of an extradi
tion case involve a determination of whether a person sought by a
284. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). See supra Part
I.B.3.a for a discussion of the origin and application of the collateral order doctrine.
285. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). In Abney, the Supreme
Court found that an order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was
immediately appealable because it constituted a "complete, formal, and, in the trial
court, final rejection of an accused's [claim]." Id. at 651, 659. Similarly, the grant of
bail in this case, if not reviewable, constitutes a final answer to the bail question.
286. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1101 (1980) (stating that
habeas corpus review of an extradition decision is limited to "'whether the magistrate
had jurisdiction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat
liberal extension, whether there was any evidence warranting the finding that there was
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty"') (quoting Fernandez v. Phillips, 268
U.S. 311, 312 (1925)); see also Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 901 (2d Cir. 1973)
(recognizing that the magistrate's decision is not appealable, but that the extraditee
may obtain review by way of a writ of habeas corpus). See generally BASSIOUNI, supra
note 23, at 737-49; Hall, supra note 23, at 605.
287. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139 (1993) (citation omitted).
288. See 18 U.S.c. § 3184 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (stating that during an extradi
tion hearing the judicial body will determine whether the evidence is sufficient to sus
tain the charge under the provisions of the applicable treaty); see also Collins v. Loisel,
259 U.S. 309, 314-16 (1922) (stating that an extradition hearing merely decides whether
there is competent evidence which, according to the law of the surrendering nation,
would justify the accused's apprehension and commitment for trial if the crime had
been committed in the surrendering nation). See supra Part l.A.l for a detailed de
Scription of the extradition hearing and the issues resolved therein.
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foreign country will be extradited. 289 The determination as to bail
has no relation to the determination as to extradition; therefore, it
is separate from the merits of the case.
In Stack v. Boyle,290 the Supreme Court, citing Cohen v. Bene
ficial Loan Corp. ,291 held that an order denying a motion to reduce
excessive bail was immediately appealable. Although the Supreme
Court was discussing a bail decision in a domestic criminal case, the
Court noted that an order fixing bail is "entirely independent of the
issues to be tried."292 The Supreme Court later noted, in Carroll v.
United States ,293 that even in criminal cases, where the use of the
collateral order doctrine is rare, "[t]he only decision of [the
Supreme Court] applying to a criminal case the reasoning of Cohen
v. Beneficial Loan Corp. . . . held that an order relating to the
amount of bail to be exacted falls into this category."294
The issues to be tried during an extradition hearing center
around whether the potential extraditee will be certified for extra
dition. 295 Thus, similar to the bail decision in a domestic criminal
case, the bail decision in an international extradition case is in
dependent from the issue to be tried, which is, specifically, whether
the accused will be extradited.
Lastly, bail decisions in extradition cases meet the third re
quirement because the decision to grant bail is effectively unreview
able upon appeal from a final judgment.296 If the government was
required to wait until the final decision in an extradition case, it
would lose its opportunity to have the potential extraditee, who was
released on bail, placed back in custody while awaiting their extra
dition hearing. The ultimate decision as to whether to certify the
extraditee would moot any review of the bail release. Either the
potential extraditee would be certified for extradition and ulti
mately surrendered to the requesting nation, or the potential ex
289. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 656; see also Collins, 259 U.S. at 316 (stat·
ing that an extradition hearing decides whether there is competent evidence that would
justify holding the accused for trial, and not whether it would suffice for a conviction).
290. 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951).
291. 337 U.S. 541,545-47 (1949).
292. Stack, 342 U.S. at 12 (Jackson, J.).
293. 354 U.S. 394 (1957).
294. Id. at 403 (emphasis added).
295. See supra Part 1.A.1 for a discussion of the issues to be determined during an
extradition hearing.
296. See Richardson-Merrell Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1985) (stating
that the reach of the collateral order doctrine is "limited to trial court orders affecting
rights that will be irretrievably lost in the absence of an immediate appeal").
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traditee would be released because certification for extradition
could not be obtained. 297 With either result, the question of
whether the potential extraditee was properly released while await
ing his extradition hearing would be moot. Accordingly, review
must be had before the extradition hearing or the right to have the
bail decision reviewed would be lost forever. 298
In Kirby, the court turned a blind eye to the collateral order
doctrine. 299 The majority cited Iuteri v. Nardoza 3OO for the proposi
tion that courts have acted before where explicit statutory grants of
power were lacking. 30r However, in citing Iuteri to make the point
that courts have acted without explicit jurisdiction, the majority
completely overlooked the Iuteri court's use of the collateral order
doctrine. The Iuteri court did not act without jurisdiction. Rather,
it reviewed whether the district court's order, which granted an ac
cused bail pending a decision on his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, was an appealable collateral order. 302 The majority in
297. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 656 ("In the event that the individual is
found to be non-extraditable, the proceedings end."). See supra notes 35-39 and ac
companying text for a discussion of the procedures remaining after the extradition
hearing.
298. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-30 (1985) (holding that an
order involving qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order
doctrine); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982) (holding that an order involving
absolute immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine);
United States v. P.H.E., Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853-56 (10th Cir. 1992) (allowing immediate
appeal of a denial of a claim of bad faith prosecution because the right not to be tried is
lost once tried). But see United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-61 (1978)
(holding that order denying a motion to dismiss based on alleged violation of right to a
speedy trial was not immediately appealable because review of the order could be had
at a later time); United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1994) (denying
inrmediate review of alleged violation of Speedy Trial Act because a dismissal without
prejudice is not a final judgment); United States v. Holub, 944 F.2d 441, 442 (8th Cir.
1991) (same); United States v. Buchanan, 946 F.2d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 1991) (denying
review of a motion to dismiss when defendant entered into a plea bargain where further
action by the court may be had).
299. The dissent, mirroring the language of the collateral order doctrine, stated
that the grant of bail at issue in Kirby did not conclusively determin[e] a disputed ques
tion. See United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 866 (9th Cir. 1997) (Noonan, J., dissent
ing). Nonetheless, the Kirby court never explicitly addressed the collateral order
doctrine.
300. 662 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir.1981).
301. See Kirby, 106 F.3d at 860 n.6.
302.. See Iuteri, 662 F.2d 159 at 161. Although the Iuteri court did not explicitly
mention the collateral order doctrine, its language negated the need to mention it ex
plicitly. The Iuteri court stated that "[b]ecause the district court's bail order gave peti
tioner relief which was collateral to the underlying proceeding, and not subject to
meaningful review on an appeal from the habeas corpus determination, its order may
be treated as final." Id.
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Kirby could have used the same approach with the result being a
much sounder basis for jurisdiction.
Speculating that use of the collateral order doctrine will prove
unsatisfactory to the federal judiciary because of its controversial
development,3°3 an alternative solution to the issue raised in Kirby
lies in the Supreme Court's rulemaking power. 304
D.

The Supreme Court Could Use Its Rule-Making Power to Put
an End to the Problem of Defining Finality Through
Case Law

Another possible solution to the jurisdictional issue raised in
Kirby, short of an explicit statutory amendment305 authorizing the
courts of appeals to review grants of bail in international extradi
tion cases, is found in the Supreme Court's rulemaking power.
When 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) was enacted, Congress provided the
Supreme Court with power to "prescribe rules, in accordance with
section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of an interlocu
tory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise provided
for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d)."306 Thus, as delineated by
§ 2072 of the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court may use this
power to prescribe rules pertaining to procedure in the courts of
appeals so long as such rules do not "abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right."307
In addition, § 2072 was recently amended to state that rules
enacted by the Supreme Court ."may define when a ruling of a dis
trict court is final for purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this
title."308 Pursuant to this authority, the Supreme Court may iden
tify specific categories of interlocutory rulings that may be reviewed
on interlocutory appeal.3 09 Congress thereby gave the Supreme
Court the power to provide for interlocutory review of orders that
303. See supra Part I.C.4.c for a discussion of the development of the collateral
order doctrine.
304. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's rulemaking power.
305. In fact, legislation, although unsuccessful, has been proposed to revise the
final judgment rule. See H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., the proposed Court Reform
and Access to Justice Act of 1987, Title VII.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (1994).
307. Id. § 2072(b).
308. Id. § 2072(c), as added by Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315,
104 Stat. 5089, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.GA.N. 5115.
309. See id. §§ 2072(c), 1292(e); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 54, § 3907, at
283.
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are not currently reviewable on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme
Court should make use of this power and resolutely lay to rest the
problems surrounding the definition of finality,3l0
The Supreme Court may handle the issue in one of two ways.
The Court could prescribe rules that specifically enumerate which
categories of decisions are appealable, or, it could attempt yet again
to define "finality." Arguably, based on the lengthy discussion in
this Note concerning the problems with defining finality satisfacto
rily, the more practical solution would be for the Supreme Court to
use its rulemaking power to specifically identify those decisions that
are immediately appealable. 311
CONCLUSION

The issue of whether the courts of appeals may review grants
of bail given by district court judges in international extradition
matters is, as evidenced by this Note, extremely complex. Nonethe
less, the issue lends itself to rather simple solutions. Rather than
arguing that bail decisions are final decisions so as to invoke the
jurisdiction provided by § 1291, courts of appeals can rely on the
collateral order doctrine to confer jurisdiction to review these
grants of bail. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could use its rule
making power to define a final decision once and for all. The
Supreme Court may use this power either to define finality or, more
wisely, to delineate those categories of decisions that are immedi
ately appealable. The only remaining question is whether it will be
the United States Supreme Court or the United States Courts of
Appeals that will appropriately define the basis of jurisdiction to
undertake appellate review of grants of bail made by district court
judges in international extradition cases.

Gina Barry

310. See REpORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, Part II at 95
(Apr. 2, 1990) ("Decisional doctrines-such as 'practical finality' and especially the
'collateral order rule'-blur the edges of the finality principle, require repeated atten
tion from the Supreme Court, and may in some circumstances restrict too sharply the
opportunity for interlocutory review.").
311. Cf. David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the
New (Dec. 1, 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 80 (1991) ("Until the
rules are in place pursuant to this new subdivision, the case law will apparently continue
to determine finality under § 1291.").

